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Cyprus and the U.N.: A Case for Non-Military
Collective Measures
The first purpose set forth in the United Nations Charter is:
To maintain international peace and security, and to that end:
to take effective collective measures for the prevention and
removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts
of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring
about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles
of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of
international disputes or situations which might lead to a
breach of peace.'
The actions in pursuit of this goal are the most visible of the U.N. ac-
tivities and, if successful, are the most essential for the continued ex-
istence of the United Nations. All U.N. members subscribe to this goal
and obligate themselves to follow the decisions made by the General
Assembly and the Security Council. For implementing this goal of con-
flict resolution, the U.N. Charter has set forth an array of measures "of
adjustment," progressing in degree of coercion from voluntary actions of
the parties to a dispute to the use of military force.2
'U.N. CHARTER art. 1(1); the other purposes listed in article 1(2), (3) and (4) are:
2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the princi-
ple of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other ap-
propriate measures to strengthen universal peace;
3. To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of
an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting
and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for
all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and
4. To be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of
these common ends.2The General Assembly derives its authority for making recommendations from articles
10 and 11. The charter does not list specific types of recommendations as it does for the
Security Council. In practice, the General Assembly has often assumed a peace-keeping
role which has included the establishment of the U.N. Emergency Force (UNEF), the
peace-keeping force in Palestine from 1956-1957 and the creation of the United Nations
Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA), which, with the help of U.N. forces, assumed
temporary administration during the transfer of West Irian (or West New Guinea) from
The Netherlands to Indonesia. Other peace-keeping measures taken by the General
Assembly have been the creation of the office of U.N. Mediator in the Middle East in 1948
and recommendations for an immediate cease-fire, the cessation of military movements
and the prompt withdrawal of forces behind the armistice lines by parties to the armistice
agreements in the Palestine crisis of 1958.
The General Assembly is limited to its powers of recommendation. It cannot enforce any
of its recommendations as can the Security Council under chapter VII.
Article 24 of the Charter accords the Security Council primary responsibility for the
maintenance and restoration of peace and security. The Council is to act in accordance
with the purposes and principles of the U.N. and its specific powers with respect to main-
taining peace and security are laid down in chapters VI and VII of the Charter.
Chapter VI, entitled "Pacific Settlement of Disputes" reads in part:
Article 33
1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger
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The case of Cyprus, which illustrates the use of a wide variety of these
methods, calls into question the effectiveness of the United Nations as a
vehicle for dispute resolution.
In the summer of 1974, Turkish land, sea, and air force invaded the
Republic of Cyprus.' The result was the occupation of about 40% of the
island, the displacement of nearly one-third of the population, and the
upheaval of the government, economy, and personal lives. 4 Despite a
series of United Nations and Council of Europe resolutions, six rounds of
talks and a United States arms embargo against Turkey, Turkish forces
have not withdrawn from the North and Greek-Cypriots continue to be
expelled while Turkish settlers replace them.'
Clearly the passage of time and the exhortations of other nations have
not been enough to persuade Turkey to honor its international legal
obligations and, as a U.N. member, to seek a settlement based on Charter
the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a
solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial
settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful
means of their own choice.
2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necesary, call upon the parties to
settle their dispute by such means.
Article 36
1. The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred
to in Article 33 or of a situation of like nature, recommend appropriate pro-
cedures or methods of adjustment.
Chapter VII, entitled "Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the
Peace, and Acts of Agression," provides for provisional measures under article 40, enforce-
ment measures not involving the use of force under article 41 and those which do involve
the use of force under article 42.
Article 42 of the Charter cannot be implemented until the permanent members of the
Security Council agree under article 43 on the principles governing the special agreements
concerning "the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general loca-
tion, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided." No such agreement has
been possible since the creation of the organization.
See generally, L. GOODRICH, B. HAMBRO. A. SIMONS, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS
(1969) [hereinafter cited as GOODRICH, HAMBRO AND SIMONS]; W. TUNG, INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM 159-214 (1969); L. GOODRICH. THE
UNITED NATIONS IN A CHANGING WORLD 109-158 (1974); L. GOODRICH AND A. SIMONS, THE
UNITED NATIONS AND THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY (1955); F.
KIRGIS. JR., INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THEIR LEGAL SETTING 381-413, 487-497,
500-525, 555-602 (1977).3Cyprus is an island in the East Mediterranean with a 1975 population of 638,900, of
whom 77% are Greek, 18.3% Turkish, and 4.7% other ethnic origins. Of the island's 3,572
square miles, 80.6% was owned by Greeks, 16.6% by Turks, and 2.8% by others (excluding
government land, roads, forests, etc.) as of 1957. C. TORNARITIS. CYPRUS AND ITS CONSTITU-
TIONAL AND OTHER LEGAL PROBLEMS 6-7 (1977).
4SUBCOMM. TO INVESTIGATE PROBLEMS CONNECTED WITH REFUGEES AND ESCAPEES SENATE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY. 93d CONG.. 2d SESS.. CRISIS ON CYPRUS: 1974 at 16 (Comm. Print
1974) [hereinafter cited as 1974 REPORT]. See also P. POLYVIOU, CYPRUS: THE TRAGEDY AND
THE CHALLENGE (1975); L. STERN. THE WRONG HORSE (1977).
5 SUBCOMM. TO INVESTIGATE PROBLEMS CONNECTED WITH REFUGEES AND ESCAPEES.
SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY. 94TH CONG.. 2D SESS.. CRISIS ON CYPRUS 1976: CRUCIAL
YEAR FOR PEACE 14 (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter cited as 1976 REPORT].
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principles.6
The purpose of this note is to examine closely the Cyprus conflict and
the U.N. involvement there to date. Further, the potential use of non-
military coercive measures7 as a dispute resolution mechanism for the
type of situation Cyprus represents will be suggested and explored.
MODERN POLITICAL HISTORY OF CYPRUS
The Road to Independence
The history of Cyprus has been particularly tortuous. Yet knowledge of
much of it is required for a reasonable understanding of the current pro-
blems and impasse to progress.
Cyprus is the third-largest island in the Mediterranean. Its location, 40
miles south of Turkey, 60 miles west of Syria, and 500 miles east of
mainland Greece, has made it desirable to anyone "who would become
and remain a great power in the East .... -1
By the end of the thirteenth century B.C., Greeks--as Achaean-
6U.N. Charter art. 2 provides:
The Orgainzation and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Arti-
cle 1 shall act in accordance with the following Principles.
1. The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all
its Members.
2. All Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits
resulting from membership, shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed
by them in accordance with the present Charter.
3. All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in
such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not en-
dangered.
4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations.
5. All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it
takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving
assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive
or enforcement action.
6. The Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the
United Nations act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be
necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.
7. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Na-
tions to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters
to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice
the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.
7U.N. Charter art. 41 provides:
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of
armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call
upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may
include complete or partial interruptions of economic relations and or rail, sea,
air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the
severance of diplomatic relations.
'T. EHRLICH. CYPRUS 1958-1967 1 (1974).
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Mycenaeans--are known to have established their culture on the island.9
Following them came the Phoenicians, Egyptians, Assyrians, Persians,
Macedonians, Romans, Byzantines, Lusignans and Venetians. In 1571,
Turkish forces added the island to the Ottoman Empire and governed
there until 1878. It was during this period that the Turkish community
was established.11 Still, Greek-Cypriots remained in the majority and by
the end of that era were calling for enosis (union) with Greece."2
The British gained the right to occupy and administer Cyprus in 1878
in exchange for tribute and a British agreement to help defend Turkey
against Russia.' 3 However, when the Turks allied with Germany at the
outset of World War I, Great Britain immediately annexed the island.
This was formally recognized by the Turks in 1923 with the Lausanne
Treaty and in 1925 the island became a Crown colony. 14
During the period between the two world wars, Greek-Cypriots grew in-
creasingly discontented with their limited role in the government of
Cyprus. They wanted amendments to their constitution which would
change the composition and power of the Legislative Council, thus
shifting much of the administrative control from the Crown to the sub-
jects. However, their agitation ended in civil disturbances and the aboli-
tion of the Council in 1931. The resulting government was comprised of
only the British Governor of the island and the advisory council,
municipal government having also been discontinued.1 5
Following the Second World War, when expectations for greater self-
rule were again disappointed, the cause of enosis became the rallying
point of Greek-Cypriots. In a plebiscite among Greek-Cypriots held in
January 1950, ninety-six percent of those voting favored union with
Greece; 16 the question was how to achieve it.
Assuming the diplomatic leadership for the enosis movement, the late
Ethnarch 17 and Archbishop Makarios III ardently opposed the new
British talk of self-government.18 As Professor Xydis recounts, "For him,
1C. TORNARITIS. supra note 3, at 7-8.
101974 Report, supra note 4, at 9.
1id.
121d.
13T. EHRLICH. supra note 8, at 1-2; 1974 Report, supra note 4, at 9. For a discussion of Bri-
tain's legal position during the period of 1878 to 1914, see C. TORNARITIS. supra note 3, at
18-27.
14T. EHRLICH. supra note 8 at 2; C. TORNARITIS. supra note 3, at 25.
15C. TORNARITIS. supra note 3,
161d. at 28-9.
17 But the Archbishop of Cyprus was even more than the elected religious leader
of his Eastern Orthodox flock and head of the Church. He was also their
Ethnarch--the leader of the ethnos, the nation of the Greek Cypriots. Thus he
had imperium as well as sacerdotium. The ethnarchic role, of a secular rather
than of a religious character, went back not to early Christian or Byzantine
times but to the Ottoman period, when the Ottoman administration, applying
the millet system to the various non-Muslim peoples in the Ottoman Empire,
vested their religious leaders with certain civilian or political powers over
thier flock and with certain responsibilities vis-a-vis the government.
S. XYDIS CYPRUS: CONFLICT AND CONCILIATION. 1954-1958 129 (1967).
"Id at 130.
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self-government without self-determination within a reasonable and fixed
time limit was 'the grave of self-determination,' and he who declared
himself in favor of self-government was 'a traitor to enosis." ' 19
Within the Greek-Cypriot community there was another and more
radical leadership taken. Coming secretly from Greece, General George
Grivas, under the nom de guerre of "Dighenis," formed the guerilla group
EOKA2 0 which, with the initial cooperation of Archbishop Makarios,
aimed at drawing international attention to the Cypriot struggle for
union with Greece "until international diplomacy--the United Nations--
and the British" would finally face and resolve the problem.
2
1
In 1954, the government of Greece requested the U.N. General
Assembly to consider the Cypriot desire for self-determination.2 2 This re-
quest marked the beginning of U.N. involvement with Cyprus. However,
neither this nor a second Greek request moved the General Assembly to
debate the Cyprus question. Then, in 1956, when talks between Governor
Sir John Harding and Archbishop Makarios had reached a stalemate and
while EOKA continued its guerilla warfare, Makarios was exiled to the
Seychelles Islands. This prompted a third recourse to the U.N., followed
by a fourth and fifth.
2 3
By now, the Turkish-Cypriot minority, led by their armed Turkish
Defence Organization, TMT,24 was taking violent action aimed at gaining
partition or separate self-determination for the Turkish-Cypriots.2 1 While
the Turkish government spoke of armed intervention if there were not an
immediate solution other than enosis, the British government in 1958
came up with the Macmillan Plan for a partnership between the two com-
munities and among the governments of Great Britain, Greece and
Turkey.26 To Makarios, this was an abhorrent prelude to partition and
confirmed to him that independence and not enosis was the most they
could hope for.2 7 Great Britain was not willing to consider the possibility
of self-determination leading to enosis; her position was that if Greek-
Cypriots would be allowed the right of self-determination, so would
Turkish-Cypriots and that would mean partition. Apparently, "the
threats of war" and of "a wider conflict" helped persuade not only Bri-
tain, but other U.N. members as well that any resolution or plan hinting
at support for either side would be too dangerous.2 8
Thus, the Greek government was never able to secure a resolution call-
19Id at 132.20Ethnike Organosis Kyprion Agoniston (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters).
"S. XYDIS. supra note 17, at 24.
22G.A. Res. 814, 9 U.N. GAOR. Supp. (No. 21) 5, U.N. Doc. A/2890 (1954).
2 See S. XYDIS, supra note 17, at 24-5.2
'
4Turk Mukavemet TeskilatL
11K. MARKIDES. THE RISE AND FALL OF THE CYPRUs REPUBLIC 23-5 (1977); XYDIS. supra
note 17, at 514.
26589 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 300 (1958). See generally, T. EHRLICH. supra note 8, at 28,
and S. XYDIS. supra note 17, at 668 n. 4.
2
"XYDIS. supra note 17, 514.28Id at 519.
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ing for self-determination nor one condemning partition. The General
Assembly merely expressed the desire that "a peaceful, democratic and
just solution will be found in accord with the purposes and principles of
the Charter of the United Nations, and the hope that negotiations will be
resumed and continued to this end. '29
A series of talks followed, first between the Greek and Turkish foreign
ministers in Paris, then between the Greek and Turkish Premiers
Karamanlis and Menderes in Zurich, and finally among Greek, Turkish
and British officials in London. At this tripartite conference, an agree-
ment was reached for the basic structure of the new Republic of Cyprus
as well as for a Treaty of Alliance 0 among Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus
and a Treaty of Guarantee3 1 among Britain, Greece and Turkey. These in-
struments did not allay the fears or fulfill the desires of the now returned
Makarios, but, "faced," as he said, "with the dilemma either of signing
the Agreement as it stood or of rejecting it with all the grave conse-
quences which would have ensued," he signed.
The Republic of Cyprus: Constitutional Problems
and Resulting Conflicts
Cyprus became a republic on August 16, 1960. However, it has been
argued that both the means by which the constitution was granted and
its contents are in contravention of the right of self-determination
adopted in the Charter of the U.N.3 3 In fact, the constitutional provisions
have been the center of contention since less than three years after their
implementation.
At the tripartite conference, the parties attempted to prevent possible
minority dissatisfaction by drafting a constitution under which the
Greek-Cypriot majority and the Turkish-Cypriot minority were given
separate and equal governmental power.3 4 This method of institu-
29G.A. Res. 1013, 11 U.N. GAOR. Supp.(No. 17) 4, U.N. Doc. A/3572 (1957). See also G.A.
Res. 1287, 13 U.N. GAOR. Supp.(No. 18) 5, U.N. Doc. A/4090 (1958) adopted after the third
and fifth Greek recourse to the U.N.30Treaty of Alliance, Aug. 16, 1960, Greece-Turkey-Cyprus, 
-Turk. T.S.-, 397 U.N.T.S.
287.31Treaty of Guarantee, Aug. 16, 1960, [1961] Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 5 (Cmd. 1253), 382
U.N.T.S. 3.
32p. POLYVIOU. supra note 4, at 12.
13C. TORNARITIS. supra note 3, at 54-59. See generally T. EHRLICH. supra note 8, at 46-48;
P. POLYVIOU. CYPRUS: IN SEARCH OF A CONSTITUTION 13-50 (1976); but cf. C. TORNARITIS.
supra note 3, at 56:
[Ilt may be argued that by Article 195 of the Constitution the authority of the
President and the Vice-President of the Republic to conclude these Treaties
was ex-post-facto recognized and the Treaties were considered as validly con-
cluded and as operative and binding on the Republic as from the date on
which they have been signed.3
'Perhaps the most salient feature of the constitution is that its basic provisions cannot
be amended, whether by way of variation, addition or repeal, while revision of the other
provisions requires two-thirds approval from representatives of each community. The
[Vol. 54:125
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tionalizing cooperation was unworkable from the start. The government
dualism, so rigidly provided for in the constitution, merely served to rein-
force ethnic separatism between the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots. As a
result, Greek-Cypriots began to place their hopes in a unitary system of
government, while Turkish-Cypriots, fearful of discrimination, blocked
government business. Among the issues most contested were the com-
position of the civil service and the army, and the veto powers of both the
Greek-Cypriot president and the Turkish-Cypriot vice-presidnt.
Aggravated by ethnic separation, frustration within the two com-
munities erupted into violence. Community conflicts of 1963-64 and 1967
were marked by fighting among Cypriots, threats by Turkey of military
intervention, 5 and the creation of Turkish-Cypriot enclaves scattered
throughout the island.
The first major clash followed President Makarios' proposal of thirteen
revisions of the constitution. It was clear to him that, due to the
separatist tendency which pervaded the constitution, there would never
be an effective government or cooperative spirit among Cypriots. Thus in
November 1963, President Makarios sent a thirteen-point memorandum
to Dr. Fazil Kutchuk, the vice-president of the Republic, as well as to the
three guaranteeing powers. Among the proposed revisions were: the
abandonment of the president's and vice-president's veto powers; the
election by the whole House of Representatives of the Greek president
and Turkish vice-president of the House, rather than election by their
respective communities; and the participation of Greek- and Turkish-
Cypriots in the civil service and in the army made proportional to their
population. 6
president, a Greek-Cypriot, is elected by the Greek community. Similarly, the vice-
president is a Turkish-Cypriot and is elected by that community. The executive powers are
co-terminous, with the president and the vice-president each having the power of veto over
foreign affairs, defense and internal security. Both communities were afforded complete
autonomy over the legislation and administration of education, religion, culture and taxa-
tion. T. EHRLICH. supra note 8, at 37. See also 1974 Report, supra note 4, at 10 and C.
TORNARITIS. supra note 3, at 65.
351974 Report supra note 4, at 11.
36The rest of the thirteen points were:
1.The vice-president of the House of Representatives should act as the presi-
dent of the House in case of his temporary absence or incapacity to per-
form his duties;
2.Unified municipalities should be established;
3.The division of the Security Forces into Police and Gendarmery should be
abolished;
4.The numerical strength of the Security Forces and of the Defence Forces
should be determined by a Law;
5.The number of members of the Public Service Commission should be
reduced from ten to five;
6.All decisions of the Public Service Commission should be taken by simple
majority;
7.The Greek Communal Chambers should be abolished;
8.The administration of justice should be unified;
9.The constitutional provisions regarding separate majorities for enactment
of certain laws by the House of Representative should be abolished;
10.The Vice-President of the Republic should act as the President of the Rep-
19781
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Dr. Kutchuk promised to consider the proposals, but before he had
done so the Turkish government rejected them all. President Makarios
would not accept this rejection and circumvention of Turkish-Cypriot
authority. Five days later, intercommunal fighting broke out and each
side accused the other of having planned war beforehand.37 After the first
conflict, Turkish-Cypriots initiated a strict policy of self-isolation which,
as U Thant reported, had "led the community in the opposite direction
from normality."38 In January 1964, a conference was held in London
between the Republic of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey, the United Kingdom
and the two communities of Cyprus. However, the parties failed to reach
a new settlement.
The Republic of Cyprus then presented the situation to the U.N.. In a
Security Council resolution adopted March 4, 1964, a peacekeeping force
was created and a mediator appointed to promote a peaceful solution "in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations having in mind the
well-being of the people of Cyprus as a whole."3 9
Nonetheless, fighting continued and in August 1964, Turkish fighter
bombers struck Greek-Cypriot positions.40 Then in March of 1965, the ap-
public in case of his temporary absence or incapacity to perform his duties.
President Makarios, Proposals to Amend the Cyprus Constitution, 1964 INT'L REL 8-25.
3 7SUBCOMM. TO INVESTIGATE PROBLEMS CONNECTED WITH REFUGEES AND ESCAPEES
SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 94TH CONG.. 1ST SESS., CRISIS ON CYPRUS: 1975 at 7
(Comm. Print 1975) [hereinafter cited as 1975 REPORT].
3
"JUS CYPRI, BACKGROUND NOTES ON CYPRUS 49, app. VI (1976).
3919 U.N. SCOR. Supp. (Jan. - June 1964) 103, U.N. Doc. S/557S (1964). T. Ehrlich writes:
The United Nations presence on Cyprus served to check recourse to armed
force, but it only palliated some symptoms of the crisis and reached none of
its basic causes. The Peacekeeping Force had been an important moderating
element, and had used its good offices in numerous ways, such as bringing
food to Turkish Cypriot refugees. But it had not been able to take effective
measures even to reduce the means by which fighting could occur in the
future. It had no authority to disarm, to arrest, or to prohibit the importation
of military equipment; it was, therefore, powerless to act in some areas where
action was needed.
T. EHRLICH. supra note 8, at 92.
40T. Ehrlich, supra, note 8 at 61. The Turkish attack of August 7 and 8, 1964 was the
culmination of several months of Turkish threats and of recent Greek-Cypriot attacks
against the Kokkina-Mansoma area on the north-western coast. It was there that Turkish-
Cypriots were continually concentrating. It was also there that Turkey had allegedly been
landing arms and supplies from Turkey in addition to food and clothing for the inhabitants
of the area. Turkish leaders contended that the Turkish-Cypriots would be harmed if they
returned to their homes. The Cypriot government, on the other hand, insisted that this was
not the case and that Turkey was encouraging the refugees to remain in armed camps, pro-
tected by Turkish Cypriot forces, to preserve the position that partition or federation are
the only possible solution to the crisis. Id. at 61-62.
Comments made by U.N. Secretary-General U. Thant on December 12, 1964 and March
11, 1965 indicate his agreement with the latter view:
The situation is complicated by evidence made available to UNFICYP that
certain non-normal conditions are being kept in existence by measures ap-
plied by the Turkish Cypriot Community to its own members.
The Turkish Cypriot policy of self-isolation has led the community in the op-
posite direction from normality. The Community leadership discourages the
Turkish Cypriot population from engaging in personal, commercial or other
contacts with Greek Cypriot compatriots from applying to government of-
fices in administrative matters or from re-settling in their home villages if
[Vol. 54:125
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pointed U.N. mediator, Dr. Galo Plaia, submitted a report which, though
intended to be the basis of a new solution, was rejected summarily by
Turkey.41 The report concluded that Cyprus should remain an indepen-
dent state and renounce its right to unite with Greece; that the island
should be demilitarized; that talks should take place between the Greek
and Turkish-Cypriots; that a U.N. commissioner on Cyprus should super-
vise the protection of Turkish-Cypriot rights; and that there should not
be a partition or geographical separation of the Greek and Turkish com-
munities. 42
With regard to the last recommendation, Dr. Plaza wrote:
[Tihe arguments for the geographical separation of the two
communities under a federal system of government have not
convinced me that it would not inevitably lead to partition.
Again, if the purpose of a settlement of the Cyprus question
is to the preservation rather than the destruction of the State
and if it is to foster rather than to militate against the develop-
ment of a peacefully united people, I cannot help wondering
whether the physical division of the minority from the major-
ity should not be considered a desperate step in the wrong
direction. I am reluctant to believe, as the Turkish Cypriot
leadership claims, in the 'impossibility' of Greek Cypriots and
Turkish Cypriots learning to live together again in peace. In
those parts of the country where movement controls have been
they are refugees.
Jus CYPRI, supra note 38, at 49, app. VI.
The following order of the Turkish-Cypriot leadership was also brought to the attention
of UNFICYP and the U.N. Security Council on December 12, 1974:
Turkish Cypriots not in possession of a permit are prohibited to enter the
Greek sector.
1.Those who disobey the order with a view to trading with Greek Cypriots
should pay a fine of L25 or be punished by imprisonment.
2.A fine will be imposed on:
a) those who converse or enter into negotiation with Greek Cypriots or ac-
company any stranger into our sector;
b) those who come into contact with Greek Cypriots for official work;
d) Those who visit the Greek Cypriot hospital for examination or in order
to obtain pharmaceuticals.Id.
411974 REPORT supra note 4, at 12.
42JUS CYPRI. supra note 38, at 49-50, app. VI. The pertinent paragraphs read as follows':
Para. 72 They [Turkish-Cypriots] wished to be physically separated from the
Greek community. Their first inclination had been to seek this separation
through the outright physical partitioning of Cyprus between the Turkish
and Greek nations. However, they modified this concept to that of creating a
federal state over the physical separation of the communities.
Para. 73. Their proposals envisaged a compulsory exchange of population in
order to bring about a state of affairs in which each community would occupy
a separate part of the island. The dividing line was in fact suggested: to run
from the village of Yialia on the northwestern coast through the town of
Nicosia in the centre and Famagusta in the east. The zone lying north of this
19781
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
relaxed and tensions reduced they are already proving other-
wise.43
The federal form of government proposed by the Turkish-Cypriots en-
visaged a dividing line separating the northern forty percent of Cyprus
from the rest, including the division of the important cities of Famagusta
and Nicosia.44
For three years after the August 1964 bombing by Turkey, tension con-
tinued over the existence of Turkish-Cypriot enclaves with the Cyprus
government trying to terminate them in favor of desegregation and the
Turkish government repeatedly threatening to land troops 45 in order to
maintain them as they were.
Then, on April 21, 1967, a military junta took over the government of
Greece by a coup d'etat. Relations between the Cypriot and Greek
governments became tense as the military government seemed willing to
accept a settlement whereby enosis would be accomplished at the price of
territorial concessions made to Turkey. The Cypriot government was also
very concerned about the possibility of General Grivas leading a coup
with the help of Greek officers of the Cypriot National Guard in order to
line was claimed by the Turkish Cypriot community; it is said to have an area
of 1,084 square miles or 38% of the total area of the Republic.
Para. 153. In the first place, the separation of the communities is utterly
unacceptable to the majority community of Cyprus and on present indica-
tions could not be imposed except by force. It would seem to require a com-
pulsory movement of the people concerned--many thousands on both sides-
contrary to all the enlightened principles of the present time, including those
set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Moreover, this would
be a compulsory movement of a kind that seems likely to impose severe hard-
ships on the families involved as it would be impossible for all of them, or
perhaps even the majority of them, to obtain an exchange of land or occupa-
tion suited to their needs or experience; it would entail also an economic and
social disruption which could be such as to render neither part of the Country
viable. Such a state of affairs would constitute a lasting, if not permanent,
cause of discontent and unrest.
Para. 154. Moreover, the proposed federated states would be separated by
an artificial line cutting through interdependent parts of homogeneous areas
including, according to the Turkish Cypriot proposals, the cities of Nicosia
and Famagusta. Would not such a line of division inevitably create many ad-
ministrative difficulties and constitute a constant cause of friction between
two mutually suspicious popluations? In fact, the arguments for the
geographical separation of the two communities under a federal system of
government have not convinced me that it would not inevitably lead to parti-
tion.
Para. 155. I am reluctant to believe, as the Turkish Cypriot leadership
claims, in the 'impossibility' of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots learning
to live together again in peace. In those parts of the country where movement
controls have been relaxed and tensions reduced, they are already proving
otherwise.
43PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICE (CYPRUS). THE CYPRUS PROBLEM 10 (Rev. ed. 1977)
thereinafter cited as THE CYPRUS PROBLEM].
44See note 42, supra; C. TORNARITIS. supra note 3, at 71-2.
4sT. EHRLICH. supra note 8, at 91.
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depose Makarios and declare enosis. 46
That same year, the Cypriot government made a number of efforts to
ameliorate conditions on the island. Among them was the release of Rauf
Denktash, the president of the Turkish Communal Chamber who had
recently been arrested after returning from a self-imposed exile during
the 1963 conflicts. In addition, the government decided to relinquish the
fortifications near important Turkish-Cypriot enclaves and to cease the
Greek-Cypriot police patrolling of the highway between Nicosia and
Limassol.47
Hopes for peace were dashed once more in November 1967. The police
had decided in September that patrolling was again necessary. The com-
mander of the U.N. Peace-Keeping Force on Cyprus had proposed that
the patrols slowly begin again in November and that if negotiations
failed, the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) would escort the
patrols. By November 14, General Grivas, leading the National Guard,
had grown impatient; he decided that patrolling should begin under the
protection of the National Guard, and it did. But when the fourth patrol
was fired upon from a Turkish-Cypriot roadblock, the National Guard
responded with heavy machine guns, mortars and artillery. Heavy
fighting then occurred in a nearby village only to end on November 16
after strong U.N. protests.4 8 Then, after negotiations among the govern-
ments of Greece, Turkey, Cyprus and the United States, the Greek
government decided to withdraw all Greek forces except for the 950-man
contingent allowed by the Zurich-London agreements.
Negotiations continued as both sides accepted the U.N. Secretary-
General's offer of aid in the intercommunal talks (beginning June 24,
1968), with participation of his personal representative in Cyprus and the
counsel of two constitutional experts from Greece and Turkey.49
Although progress was made on a compromise, the fruits of the negotia-
tions were never realized, as the talks were terminated by the 1974 inva-
sion.1°
The Turkish Invasion
The government of Cyprus was overthrown on July 15, 1974 by Greek
officers commanding the Greek-Cypriot National Guard. Untouched by
assassins' bullets, President and Archbishop Makarios escaped to
"Id. at 93, 95-96.
4Id. at 97, 102.
1'22 U.N. ScoR, Supp. (July-Dec. 1967) 215-24, U.N. Doc. S/8248 (1967).
41C. TORNARITIS, supra note 3, at 73.
'OP. POLYVIOU, supra note 33, at 206. The Turkish-Cypriots agreed to give up such special
rights as the veto and the 70:30 ratio for the Public Service. The new ratio would corres-
pond more closely with the island's demography. In return, the Greek-Cyriots were willing
to recognize and establish more Turkish-Cypriot power in local administration. It was the
scope of local government which was still in contention. The Turkish-Cypriots preferred a
strict regional division between the two groups with regional autonomy. The Greek-
Cypriots were opposed to this proposal because it was believed that this would further
polarize the communities and lead to economic instability for the Island.
P. POLYVIOU, supra note 4, at 44. See generally P. PoLYviou. supra note 33, at 179-206.
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London and was replaced by Nikos Sampson as acting president. Five
days later Turkish forces landed on Cyprus. The first day, Greek-
Cypriots were able to retain all but a narrow corridor from Kyrenia to
Nicosia. It was, however, a very important corridor, for it would provide
Turkey with an important access to the sea in Cyprus. The U.N. Security
Council called for a cease-fire and an immediate withdrawal of foreign
troops." The first cease-fire was effected July 22. Nonetheless, Turkish
forces continued to advance.
52
In Athens, certain generals met to discuss the role that Greece should
now play. They were opposed to Brigadier Ioannides, who, after ousting
George Papadopoulos in November 1973, had "wielded shadowy author-
ity over Greece in his official capacity as head of the military police
(ESA).'" 53 loannides, it seemed, would have responded to the Turkish ag-
gression against Cyprus with a Greek attack against Turkey. The
generals decided to call back a more moderate civilian leader, one who
would act by negotiations rather than by war. They chose former Presi-
dent Constantine Karamanlis, and on the evening of July 23 he returned
from Paris. The Greek people were ecstatic: military rule was ending
after seven long years.5 4 For Cyprus, the end of military rule in Greece
meant the end of the week-long Sampson regime and a return to constitu-
tional government. Nonetheless, Turkish troops were not withdrawn;
their goal was not reached by a return to the status quo.
In accordance with Security Council Resolution 353,55 Great Britain,
Greece and Turkey met in Geneva on July 26 to negotiate the terms for
peace; on July 30 they agreed to implement the U.N. sponsored cease-fire
on Cyprus. The Turkish forces, however, often violated the cease-fire. 56
On August 13, the Turks issued an ultimatum in the form of a proposal
for a federal system by which the Turkish-Cypriots would be governed by
a separate administration in a zone amounting to thirty-eight percent of
51S.C. Res. 353, 29 U.N. SCOR (1781st mtg.) 7, U.N. Doc. S/p.v. 1781 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as S.C. Res. 353]. See generally, 1974 REPORTS, supra note 4, at 14-17.
521974 REPORT. supra note 4, at 15; 1975 REPORT, supra note 37, at 10.
5 STERN. Bitter Lessons: How we have Failed in Cyprus, 19 FOREIGN POL'Y 34, 41 (1975).
541974 Report, supra note 4, at 15.
"S.C. Res. 353, supra note 51.56As one author points out:
By the time the Turks got to Geneva they were confident of two things: they
were the masters of the ground in Cyprus and there was no likelihood of an in-
terventionist power play by the United States such as occurred in 1964 and
1967. During the exploratory cease-fire violations, there were no strong
remonstrations from Washington. In fact, the State Department was saying
publicly the day before the collapse of Geneva II that "we recognize the posi-
tion of the Turkish community on Cyprus requires considerable improvement
and protection." In Ankara that could well have been interpreted as a green
light.
From the outset of the Geneva meeting the Turks appeared determined to im-
pose a permanent solution of the Cyprus question within the framework of
the "new realities" on the island. British Foreign Minister Callaghan charged
openly that the Turks came to Geneva not to negotiate but to issue an
ultimatum to the Greeks.58
L. STERN. supra note 53, at 72.
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Cyprus. The Turkish foreign minister wanted an immediate answer, and
when Greek Foreign Minister George Mavros asked for a thirty-six hour
recess, the Turkish response once again was agression1
7
57The second Turkish invasion in which the initial occupation force of 20,000 troops
doubled, was described in the 1974 Senate Study Mission Report as follows:
Thus, one day later, on August 14, before dawn, the Turkish Army, heavily
reinforced with armor and wielding the advantage of complete air superiority,
slashed across Cyprus towards both east and west. In three days, this over-
whelming military thrust sliced off at least 40% of Cyprus which was slightly
more than what the Turks had been demanding in the Geneva talks. The rapid
and effortless Turkish advance on Cyprus had both a profound repercussion
at the International level and a devastating effect on the population of the
island.
1974 Repor supra note 4, at 16.
The Turkish government justified its actions by many of the same arguments it used
during the 1960's when threats of Turkish force were frequent. For an account of the
former arguments see, T. EHRLICH. supra note 8 at 65-89. Preeminent among these is the
thesis that Turkey was acting under its powers as a Guarantor State. Article IV of the
Treaty of Guarantee states that:
In the event of any breach of the provisions of the present Treaty, Greece, the
United Kingdom, and Turkey undertake to consult together, with a view to
making representations, or taking the necessary steps to ensure observance
of those provisions.
In so far as common or concerted action may prove impossible, each of the
three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim
of re-establishing the state of affairs established by the present Treaty.
The Turkish government has contended that the anti-Markarios coup was a "breach of the
provisions" of the Treaty and that the Turkish troops were on a peace mission aimed at
protecting the Turkish-Cypriot minority.
Many have countered this thesis with the following argument: 1) There was no breach of
the Treaty, as the coup leaders had no intention of altering the constitution of Cyprus or
the island's status as an independent, non-aligned state; 2) even if the coup did constitute a
breach of the Treaty, Turkey did not have "the right to take action" under article IV of the
Treaty because Turkey did not have "the sole aim of reestablishing the state of affairs
established by the present Treaty"; it did not first consult with Greece and the United
Kingdom; and it did not have the authority to use force as "the right to take action."
Evidence suggests that far from reestablishing the status quo, the Turkish aim of armed
intervention was to create a divided island and to impose separate administrations on the
two geographical regions. This "new political reality" would be reinforced by mass popula-
tion transfers or forced Greek-Cypriot evacuation, Turkish-Cypriot migration north and
Turkish immigration from the mainland. Furthermore, reestablishment of the status quo
could no longer be claimed as the Turkish aim after the former constitutional order was
reestablished.
Further, it is argued that Turkey did not have "the right to take action," because it did
not fulfill the prerequisite to unilateral action required under article IV of the Treaty.
Turkey did not first consult with the other two Guarantor nations. The only meeting held
was one between Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit and representatives of the British govern-
ment after the first Turkish invasion. The consultation was after the fact, did not include
Greece and cannot be said to have proven that concerted action was impossible.
The thesis continues that even if Turkish actions could be construed to have met the re-
quirements of article IV, the legitimate use of force was precluded by articles 2 (4) and 103
of the U.N. Charter. Article 103 provides that in the case of a conflict of obligations under
the Charter and an international agreement, such as the Treaty of Guarantee, the Charter
prevails. Article 2 (4) of the U.N. Charter prohibits the use of force by a member nationi Ar-
ticle 53 of the Charter qualifies this by providing that "no enforcement action shall be
taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of
the Security Council." The Treaty of Guarantee has not been considered a regional agree-
ment, and, even if it were, Turkey did not first obtain authorization of the Security Council
for the invasion. Thus, the conclusion is reached that the invasions cannot be justified on
the basis of Turkey's powers under the Treaty of Guarantee. A. Fatouros, How to Resolve
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For the Cypriots, this new attack by 40,000 Turkish troops meant the
creation by a fait accompli of two separate and distinct regions-one
Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot, the other Greek-Cypriot:
The Turks finally decamped on a line extending across the en-
tire northern tier of the island. With a public-relations
maladroitness of epic proportions they decided to call the new
demarcation boundary the Attila Line. Though Attila was a
national hero in Turkey, this name is synonymous with bar-
barism to the rest of the world. Within the borders of the
Attila Line were encompassed the major portion of the Cypriot
economy and a Greek population of some 200,000 which
turned into a refugee tide flowing southward. After two days
of military expansion during which Turkish troops virtually
ran all the way to the Attila Line, the Turks stopped and
agreed, yet again, to a cease-fire. At that point, Ankara had
secured all the territory it wanted.5 8
U.N. RESPONSE TO THE INVASION AND ITS AFTERMATH
The United Nations has a variety of methods for the restoration and
maintenance of peace and security, many of which have been tried in con-
nection with Cyprus. Immediately following the Turkish invasion on
July 20, 1974, the Security Council issued Resolution 35359 calling for:
respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of
Cyprus; a cease-fire and restraint from any aggravating action;
withdrawal of all foreign military intervention; negotiations between
Greece, Turkey, and Great Britain aimed at the restoration of peace and
constitutional government in Cyprus; and cooperation with UNFICYP.
Later resolutions urged restraint from action which might prejudice the
sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and nonalignment of
Cyprus; restraint from any attempt to partition or change the
demography of the island, and the safe return of refugees to their homes.
The Failure of Provisional Measures
All of the recommendations6 ° with the exception of the one urging the
Problems By Refusing To Acknowledge They ExisL" Some Legal Parameters of Recent
U.S. Policy Toward Greece and Cyprus, CONFERENCE PROCEEDING U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
TOWARD GREECE AND CYPRUS 28 (Center For Mediterranean Studies and The American
Hellenic Institute ed. 1976); P. POLYVIOU. supra note 4, at 68-75; C. TORNARITIS. supra note
3, at 79-82. See generally, T. EHRLICH. supra note 8 at 65-89.
5 L. STERN. supra note 53 at 73.59S.C. Res.353, supra note 51.
6 Some of those are: G.A. Res. 3212, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 3, U.N. Doc. A19631
(1974); G.A. Res. 3395, 31 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 34) 5, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1975); G.A.
Res. 3450, 30 U.N. GOAR, Supp. (No. 34) 90, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1975); 29 U.N. SCOR
(1783rd mtg.) 7, U.N. Doc. 51 p.v. 1798 (1974); 30 U.N. SCOR (1820th mtg.) 1-2, U.N. Doc.
S/p.v. 1820 (1975); 30 U.N. SCOR (1830th mtg.) 2-3, U.N. Doc. S/P.V. 1830 (1975); 30 U.N.
SCOR (1863rd mtg.) 3, U.N. Doc. S/p.v. 1863 (1975); Commission on Human Rights Res. 4,
60 U.N. ESCOR, Supp. (No. 3) 59, U.N. Doc. E/5768 (1976).
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start of negotiations, can be categorized as provisional measures under
article 40, chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. As with all parts of chapter
VII, recommendations for such measures by the Security Council must
be predicated on its determination under article 39 that the situation
represents a "threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of
aggression. '61 In the case of Cyprus, this determination was made im-
mediately.62
Turkey paid no attention to the Security Council demands. Despite the
calls for a cease-fire in the resolution of July 20 and the Geneva Declara-
tion of July 30, which were agreed to by Greece, Turkey and Great
Britain, Turkish troops continued advancing. By July 30, Turkish-
occupied territory had doubled. On August 14, the second Turkish
military offensive was launched and when it was over, forty percent of
the island had been captured; Turkey has complied with the resolution's
mandate that all foreign military intervention be withdrawn.
Later resolutions included additional provisional measures attempting
"This chapter is entitled "Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the
Peace, and Acts of Agression." In addition to the provisional measures of article 40,
chapter VII also contains the provisions for the military and non-military collective en-
forcement measures of articles 42 and 41 respectively. Art. 40 states:
In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may,
before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided
for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provi-
sional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional
measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the
parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to
comply with such provisional measures.
It should be noted that:
Although there have been many proposals that the Security Council exercise
its authority under Article 40, it has only twice cited that article in any of its
resolutions. Nonetheless, the basic concept has been repeatedly applied.
Whenever the Council has been faced with a situation where hostilities
seemed imminent, or had actually broken out, it has given priority to at-
tempts to avert or end the use of force, by calling upon the parties to take
measures of a provisional nature.
GOODRICH, HAMBRO AND SIMONS. supra note 2 at 303.
The General Assembly may also make recommendations for provisional measures, as it
has with the case of Cyprus and other situations in the past, supra note 2. Authority for
such recommendations is granted under arts. 10 and 11(1). Art. 10 states:
The General Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters 'within the
scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any
organs provided for in the present Charter, and, except as provided in Article
12, may make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to
the Security Council or to both on any such questions or matters.
Art. 11(1) states:
The General Assembly may consider the general principles of cooperation in
the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles
governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments, and may make
recommendations with regard to such principles to the Members or to the
Security Council or to both.
See generally, GOODRICH. HAMBRO AND SIMONS. supra note 2, at 111-29.6 2The Security Council stated on July 20, 1974 that it was "gravely concerned about the
situation which led to a serious threat to international peace and security and which
created a most explosive situation in the whole Eastern Mediterranean area." S.C. Res.
353, supra note 51.
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to meet the challenge of continuing Turkish aggression. On March 12,
1975, following the February 13 declaration of the establishment of "the
Turkish Federated State of Cyprus," the Security Council adopted
Resolution 36763 which in part urgently requested the parties concerned,
"...to refrain from any action which might prejudice that sovereignty, in-
dependence, territorial integrity and non-alignment, as well as from any
attempt at partition of the island or its unification with any other coun-
try."
The resolution further states that the Security Council
regrets the unilateral decision of 13 February 1975, declaring
that a part of the Republic of Cyprus would become "a
federated Turkish state" as inter alia, tending to compromise
the continuation of negotiations between the respresentatives
of the two communities on an equal footing, the objective of
which must continue to be to reach freely a solution providing
for a political settlement and the establishment of a mutually
acceptable constitutional arrangement....
The desired conciliation on the part of Turkey did not follow. Moreover,
Turkey's continuing disregard of the Security Council resolutions was
not limited to military actions. On June 8, after eighty percent of the
Greek-Cypriot population had been expelled from the North, Turkey and
the Turkish-Cypriot leadership organized a referendum approving the
constitution of the so-called "Turkish Federated State." The preamble of
this constitution states that "the Turkish-Cypriot community con-
stitutes an inseparable part of the Great Turkish nation." In its repeated
reference to Turkish-Cypriots as Turkish citizens and to Greek-Cypriots
in occupied territory as aliens, the constitution flouts the U.N. request to
respect the territorial sovereignty of Cyprus. Furthermore, as aliens,
Greek-Cypriots can not benefit from the fundamental human and
political rights enjoyed by the Turkish-Cypriots. This designation as
aliens serves to legalize the ongoing expropriation of property belonging
to displaced Greek-Cypriots. 64
Consonant with the announcement of a Turkish federated state, the
terms of its declared constitution, and the continued expulsion of Greek-
Cyriots, is the mass immigration of Turkish citizens from the mainland.
On November 20, 1975, the U.N. General Assembly responded to this
development by adopting Resolution 3395,65 which called for the effective
implementation of earlier resolutions, and urging "all parties to refrain
from unilateral actions in contravention of its Resolution 3212 including
changes in the demographic structure of Cyprus." Nonetheless, as with
the other resolutions calling for provisional measures, compliance has not
been forthcoming.
6330 U.N. SCOR (1820th mtg.) 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/p.v. 1820 (1975) (hereinafter cited as S.C.
Res. 367].64THE CYPRUS PROBLEM, supra note 43 at 14.
"G.A. Res. 3395, 30 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 34) 5, U.N. Doc. A110034 (1975). [hereinafter
cited as G.A. Res. 3395].
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An earlier effort to place the parties on an equal footing in order to
facilitate negotiations had been the call for "the parties concerned to
undertake urgent measures" for the return of refugees to their homes in
safety. This resolution, 66 unanimously adopted l3y the General Assembly
and endorsed by the Security Council,6 7 has been ignored.
In sum, neither the provisional measures called for in the Security
Council recommendations under article 40, nor those recommended by
the General Assembly under article 10 and article 11, para. 1 have had
any significant effect on Turkish policy. And while the Security Council
has often "taken account of failure to comply with such provisional
measures," as stated in article 40,68 its mere observation and reproof
have taken on the appearance of acquiescence.
The Failure of Attempts to Achieve a Peaceful Settlement.
Like provisional measures, the other avenue used by the U.N. for the
restoration of peace and security on Cyprus is dependent on the will-
ingness of Turkey and Cyprus to cooperate and adhere to the Charter
principles of peaceful resolution of international disputes, equal rights
and self-determination of peoples. Under chapter VI, art. 33 of the U.N.
Charter, the Security Council may call upon parties to a dispute "first of
all, [to] seek a solution by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation,
arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or ar-
rangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice" if the dispute is
likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.6 9
The General Assembly may also recommend that such action be taken,
deriving its authority from articles 10 and 11.70
From the first day of Turkish agression, the Security Council called
upon Greece, Turkey, and Great Britain to negotiate immediately to
restore peace and constitutional government to Cyprus.71 Soon thereafter
the General Assembly, in its first resolution on the matter, expressed its
satisfaction that contact and negotiation were taking place.7 2 But only
one year later, it was already calling for "the immediate resumption in a
meaningful and constructive manner of the negotiations."73
Intercommunal talks were held under the auspices of U.N. Secretary-
General Dr. Kurt Waldheim as specified in Security Council Resolution
"6G.A. Res. 3212, supra note 60.
6729 U.N. SCOR (1810th mtg.) 11, U.N. Doc. S/P.V. 1810 (1974) [hereinafter cited as S.C.
Res. 365]. The matter of displaced and missing persons was also taken up by the U.N. Com-
mission on Human Rights and the Subcommission on the Prevention of Discrimination
and Protection of Minorities.
6"U.N. CHARTER. art. 40, supra note 61.
"U.N. CHARTER art. 33.7 U.N. CHARTER arts. 10-11, supra note 61.
71S.C. Res. 353, supra note 51.72G.A. Res. 3212, supra note 60.73G.A. Res. 3395, supra note 65.
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367.74 Little was accomplished at the first two rounds;75 at the third, it
was agreed that those Turkish-Cypriots residing outside of the Turkish-
occupied area in the north who wished to move to occupied territory
could do so. With the aid of UNFICYP,7 this was soon undertaken.
Similarly, the Turkish-Cypriot side agreed to allow 955 Greek-Cypriots
who had been expelled from the north in' June of 1975 to return. It also
agreed that the remaining Greek-Cypriots in occupied territory would be
free to stay and would, for the first time since the invasion, be given
"facilities for education and the practice of their religion, as well as
medical care by their own doctors and freedom of movement in the
Turkish-occupied areas.1 77 However, of the 955 applicants, only 275 were
allowed to return; freedom of movement has not been granted; no doc-
tors, nurses, priests or teachers have been allowed access; and schools
have not been allowed to operated nor can textbooks enter the area.78
After the fourth round of talks was adjourned for lack of concrete pro-
posals 79 the General Assembly called for immediate resumption of mean-
ingful and constructive negotiations." At the fifth round, held in
February 1976, both sides agreed to exchange written proposals on the
constitutional and territorial issues. The Greek-Cypriot side proposed the
establishment of a federal state which would preserve the sovereignty, in-
dependence, and territorial integrity of Cyprus. Regarding territory, the
Greek-Cypriot side has always contended that, due to its small size, the
economic interdependence of the various regions, and the lack of
geological boundaries, Cyprus is ill suited for a partition, physical or
functional. Rather, it has preferred a bicommunal, multiregional federal
state. The Turkish proposal, assuming the existence of a "Turkish-
Cypriot Federated Republic," encouraged consideration of how that
state's powers and functions should be shared with the proposed Greek-
Cypriot state.81
In February of 1977, a summit meeting was held between President
Makarios and Rauf Denktash under the mediation of U.N. Secretary-
General Kurt Waldheim. At that meeting, guidelines for further negotia-
tions were agreed to as a basis for the sixth round of talks.82 At that
round, held between March 31 and April 7, 1977, the Greek-Cypriot side
proposed the creation of a bi-regional federal state in which the area
under Turkish-Cypriot administration would comprise twenty percent of
the territory of the Republic. The Turkish-Cypriot side failed to present
74S.C. Res. 367, supra note 63.
7
1THE CYPRUS PROBLEM. supra note 43, at 15-16.
76 PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICE (Cyprus), EXPULSIONS OF GREEK CYPRIOTS 3 (1977).77I&
8Icd at 3,5.79C. TORNARITIS. supra note 3, at 101, n.217.
8"G.A. Res. 3395, supra note 65.
"THE CYPRUS PROBLEM. supra note 43, at 17-18; id. passim.
"PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICE (Cyprus), CYPRUS INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS - NEW SERIES
FIRST ROUND-VIENNA. 31 MARCH-7 APRIL 1977 at 3 (1977). [hereinafter cited as CYPRUS IN-
TERCOMMUNAL TALKS - 1977].
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concrete proposals on the territorial issue. Thus, negotiations reached im-
passe.8
3
In April of 1978, the Turkish side presented proposals meant to form
the basis of a resumption of negotiations . 4 These proposals speak of a
8Id- at 3, 9.
'"Explanatory Note of the Turkish Cypriot Proposals for the Solution of the Cyprus Pro-
blem (April 13, 1978).
The constitutional proposals describe what the Turkish side calls a "federation by evolu-
tion" which is the withholding of federal power to the State and the granting of equal
sovereignty to the two ethnic states for seven years, at which time, it may be possible to
amend the constitution and grant some federal power to the central government. I& at I,
20. For now, however, the Federal State would not be sovereign. Under these proposals,
the Federal Legislative Assembly has no independent legislative powers. It is the separate
legislative assemblies not the Federal Legislature which would pass laws regarding "life on
the Island" as well as "common specific functions essential for a federal system of govern-
ment." Even the federal budget, the issuance of passports, foreign affairs and external
defense, so inexorably federal issues are, under these proposals, to be legislated by state
assemblies. In the likely case of conflict in matter of federal legislation by the two
assemblies, the matter if referred to the federal assembly where majority approval is re-
quired for a bill to pass. Although the native Cypriot population is composed of about 80%
Greek-Cypriots and 18% of Turkish-Cypriots, the Federal Assembly would be composed of
ten members from each community. Since deadlocks would assuredly be the result in most
instances, the federal legislature would have little real power. In the case of such a
deadlock, the President of the Federal Assembly (who is chosen on a rotating basis by one
of the two communities) has a casting vote. That decision is then submitted to a separate
referendum in each state. Id at I, 22-23.
Under the constitutional proposals the Federal Executive Power is vested in two
presidents elected solely by their own states. Each one is to serve a rotation as President of
the Federal Republic to represent Cyprus in "certain ceremonial and formal functions." IE
at II, 9.
The protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms is another subject normal-
ly within the province of the federal government. Yet under the Turkish proposals, it is the
two states which limit or protect those rights. Id Thus Cypriot citizens of one state would
probably be subject to disparate treatment while in the other state. Furthermore, there is
no acknowledgment of the property rights of those people whose homes, lands, and
business were confiscated by the Turks after the 1974 invasion. Only debts or compensa-
tion might be allowed these victims, and that, only by agreement between the parties con-
cerned. Id at II, 7.
With regard to the territorial aspects of the Cyprus problem, the proposals indicate that
only 1% of the Turkish occupied area would be negotiable. Id. at I, 27. The once exclusively
Greek inhabited lower city of Famagusta, now a ghost town under Turkish control, was
singled out in these proposals as an area to which some Greek-Cypriots might be allowed
to return. However, only a limited southern portion is involved, only Greek-Cypriot proper-
ty owners were mentioned and it is the Turkish-Cypriot law which would govern there. I
at I, 28. The probable explanation for these provisions is that it would be economically
beneficial to the Turkish Federated State for the property owners in this the largest
Cypriot port to run their businesses and still be subject to limited human rights and fun-
damental freedoms. PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICE (Cyprus), OBSERVATIONS ON THE
DOCUMENTS ENTITLED "MAIN ASPECTS OF THE TURKISH CYPRIOT PROPOSALS" AND "Ex-
PLANATORY NOTE OF THE TURKISH CYPRIOT PROPOSALS FOR THE SOLUTION OF THE CYPRUS
PROBLEM" (1978).
Additionally, by enacting the provisional measures and returning to the status quo,
Turkey would have been acting under the Treaty of Guarantee by which it obligated itself
to "recognize and guarantee the independence, territorial integrity and security of the
Republic of Cyprus, and also the provisions of the basic articles of the Constitution."
However, since July of 1974, Turkey has both invoked and disregarded the Treaty of
Guarantee, depending on expediency. See note 57, supra.
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federal solution. However, the details of these proposals delineate the de
facto partitioning of Cyprus into two sovereign states, rather than the
restoration of the Republic of Cyprus under a new federal government.
The Effect of Disregard of Provisional Measures on the Negotiations.
The obvious question is whether failure to gain compliance with provi-
sional measures hampered negotiations for a peaceful settlement. The
answer is "more than likely." The institution of U.N. provisional
measures was grounded on tactical considerations. By calling for an end
to fighting, the withdrawal of troops, the cessation of unilateral actions,
and the return of refugees and missing persons, the Security Council and
General Assembly were attempting to free the negotiations of an ag-
gressor's unequal pressure. By avoiding these provisional measures,
Turkey has been able to insist on a settlement which completely con-
travenes the Cyprus Accords of 1960, the many resolutions adopted by
the U.N., and the Charter principles of respect for a country's sovereign-
ty, independence, and territorial integrity as well as restraint from force
or the threat of force.8 5
Since Turkey refused to comply with the provisional measures, it is im-
possible to say whether meaningful and constructive negotiations would
have taken place had the measures been implemented. One is left with the
impression, however, that if Turkey had had more to lose than its public
image, it might have been less stubborn in resisting U.N. resolutions and,
consequently, might have bargained rather than demanded.
NONVIOLENT SANCTIONS UNDER ARTICLE 41
Fortunately, however, the present partition need not continue. There is
yet a third channel through which the U.N. can deal with an intransigent
nation in order to fulfill its duty to restore peace and security in the
eastern Mediterranean. This is the application of nonmilitary collective
measures of coercion under article 41.86
The next step which can and should be taken by the Security Council
under article 41 is to "decide what measures not involving the use of arm-
ed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions," and to "call
upon the members of the United Nations to apply such measures.' '87 The
specific measure here suggested is the imposition of sanctions on com-
munications and on economic and diplomatic relations with Turkey and
the "Turkish Federated State." This would not only encourage Turkey to
give effect to Security Council decisions, but would give meaning and
credibility to the final phrase of article 40, which states that the Council
"shall duly take account of failure to comply" with provisional
"'See generally U.N. CHARTER art. 2, supra note 6.
"U.N. CHARTER art. 41, supra note 7.71d& See also U.N. CHARTER art. 39, infra note 88.
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measures.88
The U.N. has had little experience in implementing article 41. Only in
the case of the African nation Rhodesia have mandatory economic sanc-
tions under article 41 been ordered.8 9 The experience with the embargo
against Rhodesia illustrates how the mechanism may be set in motion
and what the possible impediments are.
Rhodesia: Implementation of Article 41.
The threshold problem with the use of an embargo against Rhodesia
was that before economic sanctions under chapter VII could be applied
the Security Council had to decide that at the very least, the situation
was a threat to the peace. 0
When the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) by the
Rhodesian white minority appeared imminent, British Prime Minister
Harold Wilson began "the task of endeavoring to internationalize a pro-
bable UDI while simultaneously maintaining the maximum amount of in-
dividual flexibility and control.91 Thus, in October 1965, one month prior
to the UDI, Britain succeeded in obtaining a General Assembly resolu-
tion condemning the Rhodesian rebellion but calling upon Britain to take
every step possible to prevent a UDI and, in the event of such a declara-
tion, to use every means to stop the rebellion.92
The General Assembly soon adopted another resolution.9 3 This one,
reflecting the African perspective, called on Great Britain as adminis-
tering state to end various racist practices in the Rhodesian government
and to call a respresentative constitutional conference immediately. The
Afro-Asian states believed that since Great Britain wanted sole respon-
sibility for Rhodesia, it should use force to end the racist regime there.
These were the only member states of the U.N. who consistently viewed
the situation in Rhodesia, even before the UDI as a threat to interna-
"As with all measures taken under chapter VII ("Action with Respect to Threats to the
Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression"), interruption of economic, com-
munication and diplomatic relations under article 41 must be predicated on article 39,
which states:
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or
decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to
maintain or restore international peace and security.
"See generally C. LLOYD BROWN-JOHN. MULTILATERAL SANCTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1975); Galtung, On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions, 19 WORLD POL. 378
(1966-67); Halderman, Some Legal Aspects of Sanctions in the Rhodesian Case, 17 INT'L &
COMp. L.Q. 672 (1968); L. KAP&UNGU. THE UNITED NATIONS AND ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
AGAINSTRHODESIA (1973); F. KIRGIS. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THEIR LEGAL SET-
TING 555-99 (1977); M. DOXEY. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT
(1971); Doxey, International Sanctions: A Framework ofAnalysis with SpecialReference to
the U.N. and Southern Africa, 26 INT'L ORG. 527-50 (1962).
9U.N. CHARTER art. 39, supra note 88.
"1C. LLOYD BROWN-JOHN, supra note 89, at 280.
"G.A. Res. 2012, 20 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 14) 53, U.N. Doe. A16014 (1965).
9"G.A. Res. 2022, 20 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 14) 54-55, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965).
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tional peace and security.9 4
A week later, Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith issued the
Rhodesian UDI from Great Britain. At the initiation of Great Britain,
the Security Council responded with a resolution condemning the UDI
and calling on all nations not to recognize the Smith regime and to refrain
from rendering it any assistance.9 5 The resolution made no mention of a
threat to the peace, nor did it invoke any of the Security Council's powers
under chapter VII.
Security Council Resolution 217, 96 adopted the following week, did in-
dicate that the council had made an article 39 "threat to the peace" deter-
mination. The resolution, drafted by Bolivia and Uruguay as a com-
promise between the British and Afro-Asian positions, stated that the
Rhodesian situation was extremely grave, that Great Britain should put
an end to it, and that "its continuance in time constitutes a threat to in-
ternational peace and security." The resolution continued by calling on
all states to impose voluntarily a ban on all exports of oil, petroleum, and
military equipment to Rhodesia, as well as to sever all economic relations
with that country. This call for economic sanctions was not an order for
mandatory compliance under article 41, but a recommendation under
chapter VI ("Pacific Settlements of Disputes").97
It was not until December 1966, a year later, when it asked the United
Nations to apply selective mandatory sanctions against Rhodesia, that
Great Britain decided that the situation was a threat to international
peace and security. For even after the UDI, when Britain brought the
Rhodesian case to the U.N., the government wanted it to be "clearly and
unmistakably" understood that it was "a British responsibility to re-
establish the rule of law in Southern Rhodesia" and not a responsibility
of the United Nations.98
In accord with this position was Great Britain's assertion that the in-
ternal rebellion in Rhodesia bore none of the marks of a threat to interna-
tional peace and security.9 9 The view of the Western, Oceania and
Socialist member nations, as well as that of Portugal and South Africa,
was in line with the British position.1°0 It was only in 1966, when the
voluntary embargo had failed to crush the Smith regime, that Great
Britain and those nations which had previously failed to support it
decided to invoke article 39, thus opening the way for a resolution under
chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.
The purposes of the British in bringing Rhodesia to the attention of the
United Nations in 1966 were: to alert the organization to a matter if
believed was of world concern, to elicit support for the economic sanc-
94L. KAPUNGU. supra note 89, at 32.
9520 U.N. SCOR (1258th mtg.) 8, U.N. Doc. S/p.v. 1258 (1965).
911d. at 8-9.
97C. LLOYD BROWN-JOHN. supra note 89, at 287.
98L. KAPUNGU. supra note 89, at 25.
99 d at 26-27.
'
0
°Id at 27-30.
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tions imposed on Rhodesia by Britain, and to eliminate the possibility of
independent action by a third country using General Assembly resolu-
tion for support.10'
Voluntary Sanctions.
The first step in applying international pressure was a voluntary em-
bargo suggested by Great Britain. In December 1965, Parliament
decided to institute Britain's own oil embargo against Rhodesia as well
as an oil airlift for Zambia.1 0 2 However, Prime Minister Wilson was
mistaken in relying on the application of voluntary sanctions to bring
down the Smith regime, or even to force it to retract its illegal declara-
tion, for many nations failed to enforce the embargo.
Thus Britain requested a Security Council meeting, and in early 1966
the council adopted Resolution 221103 calling upon the Portuguese
government to prohibit the pumping of oil through a pipeline from Beira,
then a Portuguese-controlled port in Mozambique, to Rhodesia and to
refrain from receiving at Beira oil en route to Rhodesia. The resolution
further called upon all states to divert any of their vessels destined for
Rhodesia and for Great Britain "to prevent by the use of force if
necessary the arrival at Beira of vessels reasonably believed to be carry-
ing oil destined for Rhodesia."
This resolution also failed to bring about the desired results. In
December 1966, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs George
Brown stated in the Security Council that voluntary economic sanctions
against Rhodesia had been an experiment in international cooperation
and had had a much smaller economic and political impact than
expected.0 4
Mandatory Trade Embargo.
So on December 16, 1966 the first U.N. resolution involving mandatory
economic sanctions was adopted. Resolution 232105 called for states to im-
pose a mandatory but selective embargo on key imports from and ex-
ports to Rhodesia.10 6 Less than two years later, it was evident that
1 k1.L at 25.
102C. LLOYD BROWN-JOHN. supra note 89, at 296. This decision "was based upon the dual
assessment that an airlift could supply Zambian needs in the short run and that if other
states volunteered support, Smith's regime would collapse by Easter 1966." Id at 297.
10321 U.N. SCOR (1277th mtg.) 5-6, U.N. Doc. s/pv. 1277 (1966). [Hereinafter cited as S.C.
Res. 277.]
'O4L. KAPUNGU. supra note 89, at 130.
10521 U.N. SCOR (1340th mtg.) 7-9, U.N. Doc. S/p.v. 1340 (1966). [Hereinafter cited as
S.C. Res. 232.]
"'
0 The imports to be banned were the key commodities of Rhodesian export trade:
asbestos, iron ore, chrome, pig-iron, sugar, tobacco, copper, meat and meat products,
hides, skins and leather. The prohibited exports of member nations were the export of
petroleum, arms, ammunition, military equipment, vehicles and aircraft.
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stronger measures were necessary. Thus in May 1968, the Security Coun-
cil adopted Resolution 253107 which expanded the previous embargo to in-
clude: prohibition of all trade with Rhodesia, except medical, educational
and, in some humanitarian circumstances, food supplies; financing
restrictions; denial of entrance into the territory of member nations of
persons with Rhodesian passports or of those residents of Rhodesia who
have been or are engaged in actions which encourage the UDI; and pro-
hibition of commercial airline access to Rhodesia. The Council also
established a committee to examine reports on the implementation of the
resolution. Coming on the heels of incidents of South African and Por-
tuguese trading with Rhodesia, the unanimous decision seemed to in-
dicate a willingness on the part of the major powers to abide by the sanc-
tion. However, the assumption was disproved and the optimism disap-
pointed with the flagrant violations by the United States with respect to
the importation of chrome; legalized by the Byrd Amendment.10 8
Yet later developments indicate greater support for the embargo. In
March 1970, the Security Council passed Resolution 277,109 requiring a
total interruption of economic and diplomatic relations, including the
closing of consular offices in Rhodesia and the interruption of all means
of transportation to and from Rhodesia. In April 1976, the Council, with
the United States as a co-sponsor, unanimously approved specific
economic sanctions involving the prohibition against all grants of
trademark and franchise rights to any commerical, industrial or public
utility in Rhodesia.110 Furthermore, the Byrd Amendment was repealed
on March 18, 1977.111
The Rhodesian Lesson.
The inability of members to agree on the function of sanctions against
Rhodesia, which delayed Security Council application of mandatory com-
prehensive sanctions, is largely responsible for those sanctions' ineffec-
tiveness. Eleven years had elapsed between the time of Wilson's first
threat of economic measures and the full exercise of economic and
diplomatic sanctions and the partial use of communication sanctions
under article 41. This lapse of time allowed Rhodesia to develop
strategies to counter the embargo, such as the substitution of other com-
modities and the development of new, albeit surreptitious, markets for
the prohibited exports.1 2
1023 U.N. SCOR (1428th mtg.) 5-7, U.N. Doc. S/p.v. 1428 (1968). [Hereinafter cited as
S.C. Res. 253.]
'
08See generally, S. PARK & A. LAKE. BUSINESS As UUSAL-TRANSACTIONS VIOLATING
RHODESIAN SANCTIONS (1973); Armed Forces Appropriation Authorization, 1972, Pub. L.
No. 92-156, §503, 85 Stat. 423.
10925 U.N. SCOR (1535th mtg.) 5, U.N. Doc. S/p.v. 1535 (1970).
110S.C. Res. 388, 31 U.N. SCOR (1907th mtg.) 16-7, U.N. Doc. S/p.v. 1907 (1976).
"'Repeal of the Byrd Amendment, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-12.
'
2 M. DOXEY. supra note 89, at 75-86; Galtung, supra note 89, at 393-414; L. KAPUNGU.
supra note 89, at 130.
[Vol. 54:125
CYPRUS AND THE U.N.
The hesitation of members of the Security Council fully to invoke arti-
cle 41 was largely due to their reluctance to call the Rhodesian situation
"a threat to international peace and security." Never before had a situa-
tion not involving the use of force between nations been determined to be
such a threat.113 Apparently, members of the Security Council first
decided to adopt the resolution ordering the mandatory embargo for
reasons other than a belief that the situation in Southern Rhodesia con-
stituted a threat to the international peace and security in the tradi-
tional, strict use of the phrase. Western, Oceania and Latin American
states (with the exceptions of Portugal, Uruguay, and Argentina) used a
determination under article 39 and the subsequent resort to article 41 to
express support for Great Britain and, when stronger measures were
needed, they used article 39 to express disapproval of the gross human
rights violations under the Smith Regime.1 1 4 When France and the
socialist states for the first time voted in May 1968 to impose sanctions
on Rhodesia, it was for the symbolic function of expressing to the Afro-
Asian states their humanitarian concern. 1 5 It was the Afro-Asian coun-
tries which solely and consistently maintained, even before the UDI, that
the situation was in fact a threat to international peace and security.
Only with respect to the situation in Rhodesia have mandatory
economic sanctions under article 41 been ordered by the Security Coun-
cil. Imposed without well formulated goals or strategies, economic sanc-
tions against Rhodesia were not as immediately effective as Great
Britain had hoped. One reason for this was that the imposition of
economic sanctions was originally viewed by most supporting members
of the Security Council as intended to play a symbolic rather than coer-
cive role. Effectiveness was not a primary consideration. As one scholar
has written,
There was, therefore, no consensus of opinion at the United
Nations as to exactly what the objectives of economic sanc-
tions against Rhodesia were. This lack of agreement over the
goals of the sanction program led to the vague formulation and
designation of the sanction measures. The Security Council
could only formulate and designate the sanction program
against Rhodesia through compromises. Very often the com-
promises were arrived at at the expense of precision in the
definition of the objectives of the program."16
A voluntary embargo such as this did succeed in expressing moral sup-
port or disapproval. Perhaps the Security Council had not wanted to
make this situation the precedent for the full use of article 41 since a
threat to the international peace and security could not be readily ascer-
tained by the international usurpation of power by a white minority.
"
3GOODRIcH. HAMBRO AND SIMONS, supra note 2, at 295-7; Halderman, supra note 89, at
705.
11L. KAPUNGU, supra note 89, at 27-28, 33-35.
"
5id at 28-30.
1'"Id at 37.
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Perhaps also it had hoped to indicate the direction of world opinion, and
thus help Great Britain bring down the Smith regime without the U.N.
sponsoring more severe measures.
Nonetheless, time proved that more was needed. Two and a half years
later when the UDI showed few signs of cracking, the Security Council
decided midstream to reevaluate the goal of an embargo against
Rhodesia. The practical result was that the optional, selective embargo
was transformed into a mandatory, comprehensive one. The lesson to be
learned from this is that as the goals change from expressive to coercive,
so must the nature of the embargo. It would be preferable, however, for
the Security Council to make an early determination of its goals. If the
consensus is that the Council must intervene in order to coerce enforce-
ment of the organizational principle or recommendations, then the em-
bargo should be mandatory from the start and should be as inclusive as
necessary to bring about the desired results. Only then will the measures
achieve maximum effect with minimum harm in the form of economic
deprivation, waste, or hardened relationships.
In sum, Rhodesia presented the Security Council with a novel situation
for exercising its powers under chapter VII of the Charter. It was a
nonmember of the U.N. whose status as a non-self-governing territory
was questionable." 7 In addition, the rebellious Smith government had
" U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Na-
tions to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters
to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice
the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.
U.N. CHARTER art. 73:
Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for
the administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full
measure of self-government recognize the principle that the interests of the
inhabitants of these territories are paramount, and accept as a sacred trust
the obligation to promote to the utmost, within the system of international
peace and security established by the present Charter, the well-being of the
inhabitants of these territories, and, to this end:
a. to ensure, with due respect for the culture of the peoples concerned, their
political, economic, social, and educational advancement, their just treat-
ment, and their protection against abuses;
b. to develop self-government, to take due account of the political aspira-
tions of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of
their free political institutions, according to the particular circumstances of
each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of advancement;
c. to further international peace and security;
d. to promote constructive measures of development, to encourage research,
and to cooperate with one another and, when and where appropriate, with
specialized international bodies with a view to the practical achievement of
the social, economic, and scientific purposes set forth in this Article; and
e. to transmit regularly to the Secretary-General for information purposes,
subject ot such limitation as security and constitutional considerations may
require, statistical and other information of a technical nature relating to
economic, social, and educational conditions in the territories to which they
are respectively responsible other that those to which Chapters XII and XIII
apply.
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neither used nor threatened to use force on an international level. For
these reasons the determination- that the Rhodesian situation was a
threat to the peace was timorously made. Great Britain led the way as it
initially sought moral support for its own embargo and diplomatic efforts
of peacefully terminating the UDI. Many of the Security Council
members who voted in favor of Resolution 232, which termed the situa-
tion "a threat to the international peace and security" and which re-
quested compliance with a selective, voluntary embargo, had as their
goal the expression of support for Great Britain or the Afro-Asian coun-
tries and not the coercion of Rhodesia. As a result, when a comprehen-
sive, mandatory sanctioning scheme under article 41 was employed, the
Rhodesian government had already developed defensive strategies to
counter the U.N. sanctions.
CYPRUS AND THE SANCTIONING RECOURSE
Cyprus clearly presents a more compelling basis for the application of
article 41 than did Rhodesia. As indicated earlier, the situation in Cyprus
unquestionably constitutes a threat to international peace and security.
In fact, the Security Council's characterization of the Turkish invasion as
a "threat to the peace" is a conservative one. The situation might easily
have been termed a "breach of the peace," if not an "act of aggression."'118
"'In 1974, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a definition of aggression.
Following are a few relevant paragraphs:
Article 1
Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the
sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of
another State, or in any other manner inconsistent w-th the
Charter of the United Nations, as set out in this definition:
Article 2
The first use of armed force by a State in contravention of the
Charter shall constitute prima facie evidence of an act of aggres-
sion although the Security Council may, in conformity with the
Charter, conclude that a determination that an act of aggression
has been committed would not be justified in the light of other
relevant circumstances including the fact that the acts con-
cerned or their consequences are not of sufficient gravity.
Article 3
Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war
shall, subject to and in accordance with the provisions of article
2, qualify as an act of agression:
(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the
territory of another State, or any military occupation, however
temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack, or any annex-
ation by the use of force of the territory of another State or part
thereof;
(b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the
territory of another State or the use of any weapons by a State
against the territory of another State;
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Also, unlike the Rhodesian situation, there has never been any question
as to the international nature of the offenses in Cyprus. There, the breach
of or threat to international peace and security involves two massive in-
vasions and the continuing occupation of an independent republic by a
foreign nation.
The situation in Cyprus also involves the issue of human rights. In an
important Council of Europe report, the European Commission of
Human Rights revealed its finding that, during and after the invasions of
1974, Turkey violated seven articles of the European Convention on
Human Rights. This finding was based on the extensive evidence of
murders, rapes, lootings, and tortures committed by the Turkish army in
Cyprus." 9 At the present, other violations of human rights continue on
Cyprus. Not only are the Greek majority, like the Rhodesian Blacks,
deprived of the right of self-determination, they are also deprived of their
homes and possessions, and of the rights to worship and attend school. 12 0
Since there is no doubt that the Cyprus situation constitutes a threat
to the peace, coercive measures such as those authorized in article 41 are
needed. Several additional reasons support this conclusion.
First, provisional measures and recommendations for the pacific settle-
ment of the crisis have repeatedly been offered and rebuffed. The consen-
sus in the United Nations has always been that the situation created by
the Turkish invasions and occupation is to be deplored and should be cor-
(e) The use of armed forces of one State which are within the
territory of another State with the agreement of the receiving
State, in contravention of the conditions provided for in the
agreement or any extension of their presence in such territory
beyond the termination of the agreement:
Article 4
The acts enumerated above are not exhaustive and the
Security Council may determine that other acts constitute ag-
gression under the provisions of the Charter.
Article 5
1. No consideration of whatever nature, whether political,
economic, military or otherwise, may serve as a justification for
agression.
2. A war of aggression is a crime against international peace.
Aggression gives rise to international responsibility.
3. No territorial acquisition or special advantage resulting
from aggression is or shall be recognized as lawful.
I Article 6
Nothing in this Definition shall be construed as in any way
enlarging or diminishing the scope of the Charter, including its
provisions concerning cases in which the use of force is lawful.
G.A Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 143, U.N. Doc. A12319 (1974). For a full
discussion of the illegality of the Turkish invasions under the U.N. definition of aggression
and the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, see A. FATOUROS, supra note 57, at 27-28.
"'8014 THE TIMES (London) (Sunday ed. 1977).
"'2See generally THE CYPRUS PROBLEM, supra note 43, at 18.
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rected."1 Yet Turkey has steadfastly refused to withdraw its troops or to
allow Greek Cypriots to return to their homes, to repossess their proper-
ty, or to enjoy such other human rights and fundamental freedoms as the
rights to worship and to attend school in the occupied region.'
Second, Turkey is a member of the United Nations. It has agreed to
comply with and uphold the principles and decisions of that organization.
It has also agreed to give the Security Council authority to order the in-
terruption of economic relations of all members with any derelict nation
in order to give effect to Security Council decisions. Since article 41 could
be employed against a nonmember such as Rhodesia, it is imperative that
it now be applied against a member.
Third, it is not only the violent methods used by Turkey to assert its in-
fluence in Cyprus which violate United Nations principles and decisions;
the proposed Turkish political solution to the problems on Cyprus is also
clearly in contravention of U.N. principles. With the invasion, the expul-
sion of Greek-Cypriots from the North, the introduction of large numbers
of mainland Turks to the North, the prohibited access between the two
parts of the island, and the declaration of a Turkish federated state, the
Turks have imposed on Cyprus a type of partition whereby the northern
section, comprising forty percent of the island is controlled by Turkey
and the rest by Greek-Cypriots. Turkish-Cypriots, it should be
remembered, were only 18.3% of the Cypriot population before the recent
immigrations.
The U.N. Charter is opposed to such a solution which by threat or use
of force would destroy "the territorial integrity and political in-
dependence"12 2 of Cyprus. Article 2 states that "the Organization is bas-
ed on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members ' 12 3 which
includes both Cyprus and Turkey. Furthermore, the present situation
and any permanent form of partition cannot be reconciled with the U.N.
purpose of "promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex,
language, or religion."''2 4 If the present situation is allowed to continue,
the U.N. will, in effect, be tacitly reinforcing Turkey's expropriation
without compensation of the most valuable property of the island,
leaving the owners without their possessions, farmlands or jobs. 2 5
Fourth, if the de facto partition is permitted to continue, relations
among three U.N. members--Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey-can only be fur-
ther injured. Again, it is one of the purposes of the U.N., "to develop
friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of
"'See notes 57-58 infra.
1'Turkish-Cypriots comprised only 18% of the Cypriot population before the recent
Turkish immigrations. THE CYPRUS PROBLEM. supra note 43, at 2.
"'U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4).
"'IId art. 2(1).
"'IdL art. 1(3).
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equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other ap-
propriate measures to strengthen universal peace.
126
Finally, it is significant that the Turkish invasions of 1974 came at a
time when progress was being made in the intercommunal talks between
Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots. These negotiations were initiated by and
conducted under the offices of the U.N. Secretary-General and were
authorized by the Security Council on December 22, 1967. Therefore, to
allow the results of these negotiations
to be completely ignored by Turkey simply because there has
been a change of circumstances as a result of an illegal military
operation would not only sanction the use of force; even more
important, it would throw doubt upon, and make a real
mockery of, the very concept of negotiations freely entered in-
to for the purpose of resolving a complex international and
constitutional problem.127
The U.N. Charter describes a flexible system of measures encom-
passing the non-coercive voluntary effort of peaceful settlement by the
disputing parties themselves, resolutions and recommendations made by
the two U.N. organs, and the highly coercive actions under articles 41
and 42 taken by member nations against a state refusing to enforce U.N.
decisions with respect to a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act
of aggression.1 28 Past U.N. measures with respect to Cyprus have allowed
full opportunity to arrive at a voluntary peaceful settlement there. They
have also provided ample opportunity for member states to utilize the
symbolic function of U.N. resolutions and thereby voice disapproval of
the invasions and subsequent Charter violation by Turkey. In addition,
both the Security Council and the General Assembly have recommended
that the parties comply with various provisional measures, but that, too,
has failed to motivate the government of Turkey to conform its conduct
to Charter principles.
Coercive measures are the next in the series of measures of adjustment
and should be tried in this case. In contrast to a U.N. plan for sanctions
against Rhodesia, a similar plan with respect to Turkey can avoid the im-
pediment of counter-strategies1 29 if it is founded on a strict adherence to
the enforcement purpose of article 41.130 From the beginning, the sanc-
'
26Iod art. 1(2).
121P. POLYVIOU, supra note 4, at 45.
128Furthermore, any "Member...against which preventive or enforcement action has been
taken by the Seucrity Council may be suspended from the exercise of the rights and
privileges of membership by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the
Security Council." U.N. CHARTER art. 5. Finally, "a Member of the United Nations which
has persistently violated the Principles contained in the present Charter may be expelled
from the Organization by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security
Council." Id art. 6.
'"E.g., poor planning and a slow start due to the difficulty of finding a threat to interna-
tional peace and security.
"'U.N. CHARTER art. 41, supra note 7.
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tions must have a coercive rather than merely symbolic function, and the
goal of such coercion is compliance with Security Council decisions. In
the case of Cyprus, these decisions called for: respect for the sovereignty,
independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus; a cease-fire and
restraint from any aggravating action; withdrawal of all foreign military
intervention; negotiations between Greece, Turkey, and Great Britain
aimed at the restoration of peace and constitutional government in
Cyprus; cooperation with UNFICYP; restraint from action which might
prejudice the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and
nonalignment of Cyprus, and from any attempt of partition or of change
in the demography of the island; and finally, the return of refugees to
their homes in safety. " '
Compliance with all of these Security Council resolutions is an
unrealistic immediate goal, and thus too difficult a requirement for lifting
the proposed sanctions. For instance, Turkish action prejudicing the
sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and nonalignment of
Cyprus, in the form of the "Turkish Federated State," is not likely to be
reversed before further negotiations and should not be made an im-
mediate goal of the sanctions. However, withdrawing the Turkish forces
on the island, permitting the return of refugees to their homes in safety,
and cooperating with UNFICYP in the occupied region are steps which
would indicate Turkey's willingness to respect the sovereignty, in-
dependence and territorial integrity of Cyprus, and to restore peace and
security to the area.132 Therefore, these would be appropriate immediate
sanctioning goals for the Security Council to establish. It remains then to
choose among the sanctions permitted under the U.N. Charter.
'See notes 57-58 infra.
112The restoration of peace and security in Cyprus will, in the end, mean a settlement
based on the principles of the U.N. Charter which include the protection of human rights.
The right to enjoy one's property is a basic human right which is presently being denied
Greek-Cypriots, but which can be restored with the safe return of refugees to thier homes.
In deciding on sactioning goals, the issue arises as to whether Turkey should be compelled
to restore human rights which are being violated before sanctions will be removed, when
these rights are so interwoven with the political controversy, that their restoration is tan-
tamount to a political solution. Cf. L. Louciades, Int'l Seminar on Torture and Human
Rights - Working Group II Paper (October 3-5, 1977) where the issue is whether the
restoration of human rights should be a precondition to negotiations for a settlement,
rather than a precondition to the lifting of proposed sanctions. In both circumstances, the
analysis is the same. Hence, the conclusion reached by Deputy Attorney-General
Loucaides with regard to the former is applicable here:
[RIestoration of human rights should not await the settlement of related
political issues but on the contrary it should be used as a means to bring
about such settlement. This is not only dictated by humanitarian and
juridical considerations but also by the practical necessity, in the interest of
world peace and welfare, not to allow states for any reason to have unfettered
freedom to deny the basic human rights and freedoms to people under their
authority. This is the raison d'etre of any human rights system.
To accept the contrary would inevitably lead us backward to the times when
oppression in any form was an acceptable instrument for creating law.
Id at 13-14. Mr. Loucaides finds support for the proposition that the intitial restoration of
human rights is dictated by juridical consideration from: U.N. resolutions which call for
the immediate remedying of human rights violations and resumption of negotiations; arti-
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Article 41 provides for different kinds of coercive measures. These are
"complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea,
air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and
the severance of diplomatic relations."1 33 In considering the imposition of
sanctions against Turkey, the issue should be resolved as to which of
these measures would be most likely to succeed quickly and with the
least cost to humanitarian concerns.
Economic embargoes under article 41 have included boycotts of
military equipment,1 3 4 boycotts and blockades of material goods,13 5 and
restrictions on financing and foreign aid.13 6 Sanctions such as these are
designed to weaken the economy of the target nation, thereby to coerce
the decisionmakers into conforming the country's policies and conduct to
the prevailing legal order or value system.137 To be effective, these sanc-
tions must be studiously calculated and applied, taking into considera-
tion various defensive tactics which might reduce their impact.1 38
In a leading article on international economic sanctions, Johan
Galtung distinguished the "naive" from the "revised" theory of the ef-
fects of economic sanctions.139 The naive theory assumes the existence of
an upper limit on the amount of value deprivation which a system can
stand. Once this limit is reached, there follows either a split in leadership
or a split between leadership and people, resulting in political disintegra-
tion and acquiescence. The revised theory takes into account the
possibility that value deprivation may lead to political integration and
that only later, if ever, will it lead to political disintegration. Under this
theory, political integration may lead to the adoption of various counter-
strategies which shield the nation from the coercive effects of economic
sanctions. 140
cle 15 of the European Convention of Human Rights and article 30 of the European Social
Charter 1961 which recognize the possibility on the part of a state to suspend certain
human rights only in exceptional circumstances threatening the existence of the state with
the object of saving the life of the nation (which situation is not present here) and which
possibility of suspension is limited by the "Lawless" Case, 11960] Y.B. EUR. COM. ON
HUMAN RIGHTS 492 (Eur. Comm. on Human Rights) to reasonableness and good faith,
precluding as an aim of the violator, the destruction of any of the human rights and
freedoms that the state is bound normally to respect; and the Geneva Conventions, the
U.N.G.A. Res. 2675 and U.N.G.A. Res. 3220 which protect human rights even in times of
armed conflict. Id at 5-9.
" U.N. CHARTER art. 41, supra note 7.
"'S.C. Res. 232, supra note 105 and text accompanying.1351d
"16S.C. Res. 253, supra note 107 and text accompanying.
'
37M. DOXEY. supra note 89, at 1.
"'Id. at 75-84, 119, 125-37; C. LLOYD BROWN-JOHN. supra note 89, at 305, 330-43, 363,
370-80; Galtung, supra note 89, at 387-99.
"'Galtung, supra note 89, at 388; M. DOXEY. supra note 89, at 130-31.
"'These counter-strategies which Galtung describes as used by Rhodesia are:
1. sacrifice.
2. restructuring of the national economy (e.g. domestic production or
substitution of banned imports, and alternative employment for those made
jobless).
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Political integration, according to Galtung, can be achieved if value
deprivation creates all three of the following conditions:
1. The attack from the outside is seen as an attack on the
group as a whole, not on only a fraction of it;
2. There is a very weak identification with the attacker,
preferably even negative identification; and
3. There is belief in the value of one's own goals in the sense
that no alternative is seen as better.14'
In the case of Turkey, the first condition will probably be satisfied im-
mediately, since it is the nature of collective economic sanctions to hit all
elements of the society, the innocent as well as the guilty.42 The second
and, partially, the third conditions might be fulfilled if, through the use of
propaganda, 4 3 Turkish leaders attempt to underplay the identity of the
international organization responsible for the sanctions by highlighting
the role of Greece and Hellenist sympathizers in achieving U.N. support
for the measures. 4 4 Since animosity toward Greece is already a prevailing
sentiment in Turkey, the nation's leaders might in this way achieve
negative identification with the "attacker." Emphasizing Greece's part
in the sanctions might also strengthen Turkish belief in the value of the
Turkish cause by representing the conflict as a Greek-Turkish dispute.
Even if most of these conditions are satisfied, more will be needed
before the sanctions become totally ineffective. Galtung's third condition
will only be satisfied if the Turkish government's goal of forming two
autonomous states in Cyprus is the highest goal of the Turkish people. It
is not certain that this is the case, for political dissension and the ensuing
violence are major concerns of the people.
Moreover, its ailing economy is causing great discontent in Turkey;145
and the "Turkish Federated State," which is dependent on Turkey for its
financing and administration, is feeling the weight of Turkey's economic
and resulting political instability.1 46 It is therefore highly likely that the
Turkish population might be more interested in the country's economic
3. change of trades with third parties via third parties or via smuggling.
The success of these strategies depends on the extent to which each adaptive measure is
self-reinforcing (i.e. the extent to which the adaptive measures become goals in
themselves). Galtung, supra note 89, at 387-88.
'"Galtung, supra note 89, at 389.
141Id. at 389-90.
"'See generally M. DOXEY, supra note 89, at 136-37. A turkish newspaper,
'Cf TIME, Sept. 18, 1978, at 46.
'45London Times, May 6, 1978, at 5.
'"Financial Times (British), July 20, 1978 republished in Public Information Office
(Cyprus), Summary of Foreign Press 1-4 (1978). A Turkish newspaper, Halkin Sesi said
that due to the travel restrictions in Turkey, the higher fares on foreign travel, the increase
in transportation fees, and the growing inflation, the mostly Turkish tourist trade has
been greatly hurt. In the 1978 June-July period, there was a 46% decrease in tourists com-
ing to occupied Cyprus by hovercraft, and a 27% decrease by airplanes, compared to the
1977 June-July period. Therefore, only three of the hotels were functioning at a capacity of
more that 20-30%. PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICE (Cyprus), TURKISH PRESS AND OTHER
MEDIA. August 1, 1978, at 5.
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and political stability than in its involvement in Cyprus.
An arms embargo has long been regarded as an appropriate measure to
take against a threatening 147 or bellicose nation 148 because it can increase
value deprivation (specifically, of those in power), decrease the target na-
tion's future war capabilities, and act as a sanction for previous use of
arms.149 As each of these considerations is applicable in the present case,
an arms embargo should be applied against Turkey. Moreover, an em-
bargo of this nature would serve as a sanction for the continuing presence
of Turkish troops on the island.
The next type of economic sanction urged is a mandatory trade em-
bargo, prohibiting the inflow and outflow of the commodities most impor-
tant to Turkey and the "Turkish Federated State." The success of these
sanctions will depend largely on the degree of concentration of import
and export in the economies of Turkey and of the "Turkish Federated
State".150
The Turkish economy, heavily dependent on three, imports, is
especially vulnerable.'"' Also affecting vulnerability is concentration of
trade on one trade partner. West Germany is a major Turkish trade part-
ner, with twenty-two percent of Turkey's trade.
162
Turkey's exports are not as heavily concentrated in a few commodities
as are its imports. The two largest exports account for twenty-nine per-
cent of the total. 153 The next three leading exports amount to several per-
cent more. 5 4 In order for economic sanctions to be effective, the Security
Council should order an embargo on these five leading imports and ex-
ports.
'For a discussion of the cold war and Western strategic embargoes on trade with com-
munist countries in Europe and the Far East, see generally M. DOXEY. supra note 89 at
22-27.
'
48See generally Id at 14-22.
"'The U.S. arms embargo against Turkey was initiated under this last theory. It was a
legal sanctioning response called for under the subsection 2314(d) of the 1962 Foreign
Assistance Act. This law in Conjunction with §2302 provides that any country which
receives defense articles or services by the U.S., and uses them for any purpose other than
legitimate self-defense or participation in collective measures requested by the U.N., shall
be immediately ineligible for further assistance. See generally A. FATOUROS. supra note 57
for a study of the U.S. military aid issue in relation to Turkey. The U.S. arms embargo has
recently been lifted. See International Security Assistance Act, 1978, Pub. L. No. 93-384.
110In discussing this concept of vulnerability, Galtung explains that "the more a
country's economy depends on one product, and the more its exports consist of one pro-
duct, the more its exports and imports are concentrated on one trade-partner, the more
vulnerable is the country." GALTUNG, supra note 89 at 385.
"'The leading import - boilers and machinery - accounts for about twenty-five percent
of all imports. The second and third largest imports - petroleum oil lubricants and
minerals -account for almost seventeen percent each. The fourth and fifth largest imports
are transportation equipment and chemical products. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-
OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, TURKEY, at 14 (1976) [hereinafter cited as OECD]. These are
1975 figures.
"'CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE NATIONAL BASIC INTELLIGENCE FACTBOOK. at 207
(July 1978) [hereinafter cited as CIA Factbook]. The other major trade partners are: 9%
United States, 9% Iraq, 7% Italy. These are 1976 figures.
"'Cotton and tobacco are the two largest exports. OECD, supra note 151, at 54.
" Those exports are: hazelnuts; textiles and clothing; and food and beverages. Id.
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The economic embargo should extend to the "Turkish Federated
State." As with the suggested embargo against Turkey, an economic em-
bargo against the occupied area should include a ban on the leading im-
ports and exports. 155 Nearly fifty percent of all import trade by the
"Turkish Federated State" is conducted with Turkey and twenty-two
percent with Great Britain. "6 Great Britain leads the list of export trade
partners, engaging in thirty-three percent of the trade. Eighteen percent
of the Turkish sector export trade is conducted with Turkey.57
There is, therefore, a high concentration of trade partners in the oc-
cupied area, greatly facilitating the imposition of economic trade sanc-
tions. Nonetheless, if Turkey, the primary import trade partner and the
second most significant export trade partner, evades the sanction by im-
porting goods from the occupied territory and then exports them as
Turkish goods, the sanctions' effectiveness would be undermined. The
Security Council should then consider the institution of a naval blockade
to prevent trade between Turkey and the "Turkish Federated State."
Financial restrictions complement trade sanctions and must also be
considered by the Security Council if it is to devise an effectual economic
sanctioning scheme. Financial sanctions control the means of paying for
exports and imports for a nation and impede economic programs by
restricting the foreign exchange and financial grants and credits with
which a target nation conducts business. 5 8 Turkey is particularly
vulnerable to financial sanctions. The country's inability to offset oil
costs with exports and other hard currency-earners has resulted in its in-
creasing debt and in continued oil shortages for consumers and in-
dustries.'" Turkey's large balance-of-payments deficits have, in the past
year, been financed by depleting Turkey's international reserves, by
substantially increasing its short-term debt, and by extensive compen-
satory and standby financing by the International Monetary Fund. 60
If financial sanctions are imposed, they should operate to disallow the
extension of credit by foreign exporters and banks to Turkey and the
"Turkish Federated State," to the corporations and individuals within
the two target areas, and to anyone identified as dealing in foreign goods
on behalf of Turkey or the "Turkish Federated State." The restriction of
'1'Although existing data on the economy of this administration are incomplete, it has
been reported that the five leading imports are manufactured goods, machinery and
transportation equipment, petroleum products, and foods. The three leading exports are
citrus fruits, potatoes, and manufactured goods. CIA FACTBOOK supra note 152, at 49.
1161d. The other major imports trade partners are: 7% West Germany; 5% France; 3%
Netherlands; 3% Italy.
"
7Id. The other major exports trade partners are 18% Netherlands; 10% Italy.
118L. KAPUNGU. supra note 89, at 54.
"'
59MEED (British), July 14, 1978 republished in Public Information Office (Cyprus), Sum-
mary of Foreign Press 4-9 (1978). It was reported that in the second half of 1977, industry
was producing at only 45-60% capacity and that in some areas, automobile traffic was
reduced by 16% in a week. Id.
"'Press Release, Turkey: Stand-by Arrangement and Compensatory Financing, 7 INT'L
MONETARY FUND SURVEY 142 (May 8, 1978).
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foreign bank credit should also be extented to cover production of com-
modities to be exported from either Turkey or the "Turkish Federated
State." Along with reinforcing the trade sanctions, these financial
measures would impede efforts to diversify and reorganize the
economy.16 The latter goal can only be achieved if foreign governments,
international monetary organizations, private banks and individuals
cooperate in refusing to give loans to the governments and citizens of
Turkey and Turkish-occupied Cyprus, except for humanitarian purposes.
Although arms, trade, and financial embargoes dominate this proposed
sanctioning scheme, it is strongly suggested that certain diplomatic
sanctions must also be imposed at the start of this program. Article 41 of
the U.N. Charter does not describe diplomatic sanctions beyond stating
that the Security Council may consider ordering the severance of
diplomatic relations. In Rhodesia, diplomatic sanctions were imposed in
three ways: by nonrecognition of the UDI;162 by forbidding entry into
member states' territories ("save on exceptional humanitarian grounds")
of those with Rhodesian passports and those who were likely to further
the UDI or who were likely to evade the U.N. sanctions;1 6 3 and by closing
of consular offices in Rhodesia.6 4
The situation which Turkey has created in northern Cyprus, involving
de facto partition and the unilateral declaration of a "Turkish Federated
State," makes this Turkish-occupied area particularly vulnerable to
diplomatic sanctions. Like the UDI, the administration of northern
Cyprus is an illegal regime; 6 5 this makes nonrecognition both de jure and
de facto, as was the U.N. nonrecognition of the Smith regime.66
Diplomatic nonrecognition of this sort is probably more presuasive than
de facto nonrecognition only, as it is both a sanctioning and a legal
response.6 7
1611d
1
62See S.C. Res. 232, supra note 105, which refers to the Smith goverment as "the illegal
racist regime."
163S.C. Res. 253, supra note 107.
164S.C. Res. 277, supra note 109.
165The "Turkish Federated State" was not established under the Cypriot constitution or
under any of the related treaties.
'1For an extended study of the legal consequences of the distinction between de jure and
de facto recognition, see generally L. OPPENHEIM. INTERNATIONAL LAW 129-32, 145 (7th ed.
H. Lauterpacht 1948).
167 But see Hesperides Hotels Ltd. v. Aegean Turkish Holidays Ltd, [1978] 1 All E.R. 277.
In this English conflict of laws case, two Greek-Cypriot family companies brought an ac-
tion for conspiracy to effect a trespass by procuring, encouraging or facilitating the
unauthorized use of the plaintiffs' hotels in northern Cyprus which had been confiscated
by the Turkish occupiers in 1974. One of the defendants in the case was a respresentative
of the "Turkish Federated State" and the other was a London travel agency which issued
brochures and made reservations for these hotels.
In the lower court, the plaintiffs were granted a writ for damages and an injunction. The
travel agency submitted to a perpetual injunction restraining the defendants from con-
spiring to procure, encourage or facilitate a trespass to the hotels. The plaintiffs then ap-
plied for an interlocutory injunction against the representative of the "Turkish Federated
State." The judge granted the injunction after receiving a certificate from the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office stating that the United Kingdom government did not recognize the
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However, this policy of nonrecognition should be directed only against
the "Turkish Federated State." It is not the authority of the government
in Ankara which wduld be challenged by diplomatic sanctions; it is the
government's interventionist policies and actions with respect to Cyprus
and, in particular, the establishment of the "Turkish Federated State"
which are at issue. In addition, nonrecognition of the Turkish govern-
ment and the closing of consular offices for the purpose of evidencing
moral disapproval of its actions and policies would probably do little
more than arouse a victim sentiment in Turkey and elsewhere. 68 Further-
more, the closing of consular offices would cause extreme inconvenience
not only to Turkey, but also to the sanctioning nations, and would so in-
terfere with the normal channels of diplomatic communications as to im-
pede progress towards a negotiated settlement. 69
There is also a third viable method of diplomatic coercion which was
tried in Rhodesia. This entails barring entry into member states' ter-
ritories, with humanitarian exceptions, of those who have passports
issued by the "Turkish Federated State," those who are likely to further
or have furthered the "Turkish Federated State" and the Turkish posi-
tion on Cyprus, and those who are likely to evade or have evaded the arti-
cle 41 measures. In accordance with the proposed de facto and de jure
nonrecognition of the "Turkish Federated State," the Security Council
should order the nonrecognition of all acts of sovereignty by the
"Turkish Federated State." Since the issuance of passports is an exercise
administration of the "Turkish Federated State" as either a de jure or de facto government
and that the only lawful government was the Republic of Cyprus set up in 1960. The defen-
dant appealed. At the appeal hearing, the plaintiffs amended the writ to claim on addi-
tional relief of damages for conspiracy to effect trespass to the contents of the hotels.
The Court of Appeal reversed the decision of the lower court, holding that the writ
should be set aside and the injunction discharged for lack of jurisdiction and cause of ac-
tion. Roskill, L. J. and Scarman, L. J. reasoned that, under British South Africa Co. v.
Companhia de Mocambique [18931 AC 602, [1891-4] All E.R. Rep. 640, the court has no
jurisdiction to entertain an action to recover damages for a trespass to land situated
abroad, and that in order to sustain an action for conspiracy to effect a trespass to land or
to chattel, the plaintiffs must first show that they have a better title to possession than the
title held by the "Turkish Federated State." They also held that since in the amended writ,
the claim of conspiracy to effect trespass to the contents of the hotels was framed in terms
of ownership rather than possession, the writ disclosed no cause of action in trespass.
Roskill and Scarman declined to rule on the question of judicial recognition of the act of ex-
ercise of sovereignty by the "Turkish Federated State" in confiscating and leasing the
Greek-Cypriots' hotels.
However, Lord Denning, M. R. did chose to rule on this issue. He reasoned that English
courts could recognize laws or acts of the "Turkish Federated State" which governed the
day-to-day lives of the people, since it was in effective control of northern Cyprus, despite
the fact that the occupier's administration was not recognized by the British government
either de jure or de facto. Then, by his critical assumption that the laws of confiscation and
leasiLg were simply laws of day-to-day administration, Lord Denning recognized them as
the prevailing laws in northern Cyprus under which the plaintiffs are no longer the rightful
possessions of the hotels, and under which trespasses to the hotels or their contents would
not be actionable. He concluded that since the suit was not actionable under the ad-
ministration of northern Cyprus, then neither was it actionable in England.
6
'See generally C. LLOYD BROWN-JOHN. supra note 89, at 11.
111Id_ at 14.
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of sovereignty, member states should be prohibited from recognizing
those passports as validly issued for the purpose of entering the territory
of member states. A similar diplomatic restriction should be applied to
forbid entrance into member states' territories of those with Turkish
passports, those who are likely to further the illegal regime in northern
Cyprus and the Turkish position on Cyprus, and those who are likely to
evade the article 41 measures. This prohibition would serve as a sanction,
a deterrent, and an enforcement measure.
If the measures outlined above sufficiently impede economic and
military development and the establishment of the "Turkish Federated
State," then government attempts to induce the counter-strategies of
sacrifice, restructuring of the national economy and smuggling will be
unsuccessful. Political disintegration and a change in posture can be ex-
pected from Turkey if the United Nations applies a comprehensive sanc-
tioning scheme involving the partial interruption of diplomatic relations
as well as the more far-reaching restrictions on economic relations.
If, within a period of time predetermined by the Security Council, these
measures fail to coerce Turkey to comply with the sanctioning goals, then
the Security Council may wish to resort to communication sanctions. Ar-
ticle 41 provides for the complete or partial interruption of rail, sea, air,
postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication. Of these
possibilities, a complete ban on communications by rail, sea or air,
preventing all transportation to and from Turkey, would be the most ap-
propriate communications sanction and is, in fact, the one chosen by the
Security Council with regard to Rhodesia. In that situation, the Security
Council first banned flights to and from Rhodesia by airline companies
incorporated in or registered in the member states; it also banned connec-
tions between those airline companies and any which were incorporated
in or registered in Rhodesia. 170 The next Security Council resolution con-
cerning Rhodesia expanded the communication sanction to include "any
existing means of transportation to and from Rhodesia. '1 7 1 A ban of this
nature would have a coercive effect on the populations of Turkey and of
the Cypriot-occupied area at large, by barring international transporta-
tion for pleasure and for work. Additionally, some segments would feel
the inevitable drop in tourism."2 As in other areas, implementation of
_these measures must stop short of those rare instances in which the pro-
hibition of international transportation would cause humanitarian harm
because, for example, of medical or familial needs.
Use of coercive measures such as these will not be easy for those
members whose normal relations with Turkey are those of ally, trade
partner, or both. For this reason, members of the Security Council may
be more hesitant to resort to article 41 than they were in 1965, following
Great Britain's embargo initiative against Rhodesia. Nonetheless, even if
17S.C. Res. 253, supra note 107.
"'S.C. Res. 277, supra note 103.
'72See generally L. KAPUNGU. supra note 89, at 58.
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a mandatory sanctioning scheme is not approved by the Security Coun-
cil, the attempt to apply such measures wbuld serve as a valuable
political indicator, being the strongest disapprobation to date.
If article 41 sanctions are approved, United Nations members will be
required to implement them, for article 2(5) of the Charter clearly requires
compliance from all member states.'7 If United Nations members are un-
willing to comply with this obligation, then the Charter provision for
coercive action will have only a minimal deterrent effect in future crises
and, in the case of Cyprus, will permit, and perhaps encourage, evasion of
U.N. resolutions.
More than four years have passed since the Turkish invasions of 1974.
The ineffectiveness of traditional noncoercive efforts of the U.N. has
resulted in immeasurable damage to the people and land of Cyprus. Cer-
tainly the time has come for the Security Council to turn to chapter VII,
article 41 and order mandatory economic and diplomatic sanctions to
give effect to its decisions and weight to all future resolutions concerning
international peace and security.1 7 4
CHRISTINA K. NAVARRO
'U.N. CHARTER art. 2(5):
All members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it
takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving
assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive
or enforcement action.
'
74After completion of this note, a resolution on Cyprus was adopted by the members of
the Non-Aligned Foreign Ministers Conference on July 30, 1978 in Belgrade. The resolu-
tion demanded the immediate implementation of all U.N. resolutions concerning Cyprus,
and particularly recommended that the Security Council "take all appropriate measures,
including, if necessary, measures under Chapter VII of the Charter, in order to ensure the
speedy and effective implementation of its resolutions with regard to Cyprus." PUBLIC IN-
FORMATION OFFICE, PRESS RELEASE: NON-ALIGNED FOREIGN MINISTERS CONFERENCE
PASSES RESOLUTION ON CYPRUS. July 30, 1978, at 1-3.
In addition, on November 9, 1978, the United Nations General Assembly passed a draft
resolution presented by the non-alligned countries. In that resolution, the General
Assembly expressed its consternation over the situation in Cyprus, reiterated its previous
demands, and, most importantly, included the following paragraph:
[The General Assembly:] 8) Recommends that the Security Council should ex-
amine the question of the implementation, within a time-frame, of its relevant
resolutions and consider and adopt thereafter, if necessary, all appropriate
and practical measures under the Charter of the United Nations for ensuring
the implementation of the resolutions of the United Nations on Cyprus.
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